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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of essays on the effect of trade costs on international trade. Chapter 1
derives and empirically examines how factor proportions determine the structure of commodity
trade when international trade is costly. It combines a many-country version of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model with a continuum of goods developed by Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1980) with
the Krugman (1980) model of monopolistic competition and transport costs. The commodity
structure of production and bilateral trade is fully determined. Two main predictions emerge.
There is a quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction. Countries capture larger shares of industries that
more intensively use their abundant factor. There is a quasi-R.ybczynski effect. Countries
that rapidly accumulate a factor see their production and export structures systematically
move towards industries that intensively use that factor. Both predictions receive support
from the data. Factor proportions appear to be an important determinant of the structure of
international trade.
Chapter 2 focuses on the effect of preferential tariff liberalization on the direction of trade
and suggests that NAFTA has had a substantial impact on North American trade. The chapter
focuses on where the US sources its imports of different commodities from. It identifies the im-
pact of NAFTA by exploiting the substantial cross-commodity variation in the tariff preference
given to goods produced in Canada and Mexico. Canada and Mexico have greatly increased
their share of US imports of commodities for which they enjoy a tariff preference. For com-
modities where no preference is given, Canada's share has declined while Mexico's has increased
much more modestly. The empirical results suggest that Canada's share of US imports may
have declined without NAFTA, rather than increased, while the growth in Mexico's share of
US imports would have been much slower. Useful products of the empirical work are estimates
of consumer willingness to substitute between different varieties of the same commodity. The
estimated average elasticities of substitution range from 5 to 7.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of international trade costs on the volume of trade. It extends
the model in Chapter 1 to allow trade costs to vary by country and commodities. An arbitrary
country imports more commodities from countries where bilateral trade costs are lower, and
imports more from larger countries. It also sources specific commodities disproportionately
from trading partners that possess in relative abundance the productive factors that are used
relatively intensively in the production of that commodity. Useful products of the empirical
examination are estimates of the willingness to substitute between different varieties of goods
within an industry. The implied elasticities of substitution are mostly high, typically ranging
2
between 6 and 16. With such high elasticities of substitution, small costs to international trade
will sharply reduce trade volumes.
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Chapter 1
Factor Proportions and the
Structure of Commodity Trade
Summary 1 Chapter I derives and empirically examines how factor proportions determine the
structure of commodity trade when international trade is costly. It combines a many-country
version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of goods developed by Dornbusch-
Fischer-Samuelson (1980) with the Krugman (1980) model of monopolistic competition and
transport costs. The commodity structure of production and bilateral trade is fully determined.
Two main predictions emerge. There is a quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction. Countries capture
larger shares of industries that more intensively use their abundant factor. There is a quasi-
Rybczynski effect. Countries that rapidly accumulate a factor see their production and export
structures systematically move towards industries that intensively use that factor. Both predic-
tions receive support from the data. Factor proportions appear to be an important determinant
of the structure of international trade.
1.1 Introduction
The Heckscher-Ohlin model is one of the pillars of international trade theory. The insight that
commodity trade embodies factor services is a profound one. underpinning important theorems
relating factor abundance, factor prices, product prices. production and trade. Predictions for
6
the commodity structure of production and trade are, however, limited. This paper seeks to
extend our understanding of the effect of factor proportions on the commodity structure of pro-
duction and trade. It develops a model where the structure of production and bilateral trade
is completely determined. The model is a combination of the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson
(1980) model with a continuum of goods and the Krugman (1980) model of monopolistic com-
petition and transport costs. Two important predictions emerge. Countries capture larger
shares of world production and trade in commodities that more intensively use their abundant
factor. This is the quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of the model. Countries that rapidly accu-
mulate a factor will see their production and export structure move towards commodities that
more intensively use that factor. This is the model's quasi-Rybczynski effect.
The quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction is examined using detailed bilateral trade data for
the US. The prediction receives strong support from the data. Countries that are abundant
in skilled labor and capital do capture larger market shares in industries that intensively use
those factors. The effect is particularly pronounced for skilled labor. Figure 1 gives an example
using Germany and Bangladesh. Germany, where the average adult has in excess of ten years of
formal education, captures large shares of US imports of skill-intensive commodities, and much
smaller shares for commodities that sparingly use skilled labor. Bangladesh, where the average
adult has just two and a half years of formal education, exhibits the opposite trade pattern,
with exports concentrated in commodities that require little skilled labor.
The quasi-Rybczynski effect also receives support from the data. Rapidly growing countries
have seen their export structure change towards more skill and capital intensive industries. This
effect is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case of the 'miracle' economies of East Asia; Singapore,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. Their rapid accumulation of human and physical capital has
not simply led to more skill intensive and capital intensive production of the same goods, with
a consequent reduction in marginal products. Instead, ability to trade has allowed them to
shift production to more skill and capital intensive industries. As noted by Ventura (1997), this
process is a critical feature of their growth experience. The Rybczynski effect helps countries
avoid diminishing returns, and sustain high growth rates.
This paper relates to an old literature that found hints that factor proportions were a de-
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terminant of the commodity structure of international trade. Keesing (1966) calculated simple
correlations of US export performance with skill intensities. The largest positive correlations
occurred at the highest skill levels, while export performance was negatively correlated with
the unskilled labor share. Regressions by Baldwin (1971) suggested that US net exports were
negatively related to capital intensity and positively related to shares of some types of skilled
labor. Wright (1990) ran regressions for six time periods from 1879 to 1940 to search for sources
of US export success. The US tended to export capital intensive goods in the early periods,
but capital intensity became a source of comparative disadvantage by 1940.1 The problem that
rendered cross-commodity comparisons unfashionable was that they had an unclear theoretical
foundation. This argument was forcefully made in a number of studies by Leamer, who demon-
strated that export performance did not depend on the input characteristics of the industry.2 In
this paper, I demonstrate in a more general Heckscher-Ohlin model that, conditional on factor
endowments, export performance is determined by industry input characteristics.
This paper is also related to the factor content of trade studies that examine a similar
implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model; that a country's net trade embodies the services of
its abundant factors. The first factor content study was Leontief (1953), who found that US
imports were more capital intensive relative to labor than US exports, contrary to expectation.
A number of studies surveyed in Leamer (1984) followed Leontief's approach. But Learner
used Vanek's (1968) equations to establish that in a multi-factor world these studies also lack
adequate theoretical foundation. Factor content studies since then increasingly tended to be
multi-country studies firmly based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) theorem equating
factors embodied in net trade to excess factor endowments. These studies use impressive data
sets on exports, imports, factor endowments and technology for a large number of countries.
Early studies based on HOV performed poorly. Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) used
1967 data on 12 factors and 27 countries. They tested sign and rank propositions derived from
the HOV theorem. but found. at best, only modest support for the factor proportions model.
Trefler's (1993, 1995) examination of 1983 data on 10 factors and 33 countries accounting for
76% of world exports found zero factor content in net trade.
IThese results are from brief surveys by Leamer (1984) and Learner and Levinsohn (1995).
2See, for example, Learner and Levinsohn (1995).
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Subsequent work by Davis, Weinstein, Bradford and Shimpo (1997), Davis and Weinstein
(1998a, 2000), and Wolfson (1999) have shed light on why the early work failed to find factor
content. A key explanation is that countries appear to use different production techniques.
Early studies assumed that all countries used the same techniques, and estimated these using
US input-output matrices. Examination of input-output matrices for other countries show
that countries do use different techniques, and that these differences reflect factor endowment
differences. Under these conditions, factor content studies that use a common technology matrix
will systematically understate actual factor content. Davis and Weinstein (2000) show that for
a sample of 10 wealthy countries, use of actual technology matrices lifts estimates of net factor
content of trade to typically 10 to 12 percent of national endowments, and to a substantial
38 to 49 percent of endowments devoted to tradeables. The other important explanation for
the early failure to find factor content is an apparent 'bias' in consumption towards locally
produced goods.
The use of different production techniques is very interesting because it suggests that there
may be a failure of FPE. Repetto and Ventura (1998) confirm that there is a failure of FPE.
Factor prices differ systematically across countries even after controlling for productivity differ-
ences. Locally abundant factors have lower prices. The failure of FPE can be accommodated by
factor content studies by use of a multi-cone Heckscher-Ohlin model. Without a more precise
model, empirical implementation is limited by access to input-output tables. Although these
tables are becoming available for more countries, they are arguably not the highest quality
economic data available. But the failure of FPE provides us with another opportunity, because
without FPE, the commodity structure of production and trade is determined, and commodity
trade data is some of the best and most abundant data we have. There is an opportunity to
explore just how pervasive the effect of factor proportions is on the structure of international
trade.
There are many ways to generate a failure of FPE in a Heckscher-Ohlin world. One way
is to assume that factor proportions are sufficiently different that they are outside the FPE
set. Another way is to introduce costs to international trade, which could have a strong effect
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on trade volume.3 This paper takes the second route. It commences by generalizing the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, and by exploring the effects of these generalizations on trade structure.
The starting point is a many-country version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum
of goods developed by Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1980). I combine this with the Krugman
(1980) model of intraindustry trade generated by economies of scale and product differentiation.
Finally, I add transport costs. The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model can be seen as a limiting
case of this model with zero transport costs and perfect competition. The generalizations are
made to obtain predictions of the factor proportions model in all commodity markets, so that
its performance can be assessed using the very detailed trade data that Leamer and Levinsohn
(1995) claim has been "measured with greater accuracy over longer periods of time than most
other economic phenomena".
Predictions of the factor proportions model in commodity markets are primarily driven by
the deviation from FPE caused by the transport cost. Monopolistic competition smooths some
of the hard edges of the perfectly competitive model and determines bilateral trade.4 In this
model, the transport cost causes locally abundant factors to be relatively cheap. The location
decisions of industries are affected by factor costs, so that countries tend to attract industries
that intensively use their abundant factor. The model also predicts some of the technology and
demand modifications needed by the empirical factor content studies to make the Heckscher-
Ohlin model fit the data. Every industry substitutes towards the relatively cheap, locally
abundant factor. Consumers also substitute towards cheaper local varieties.
The closest theoretical papers to this are due to Deardorff (1998) and Helpman and Krug-
man.5 The closest empirical papers are Davis and Weinstein (1998b) and Petri (1991). Dear-
dorff introduces trade impediments to a Heckscher-Ohlin model to determine bilateral trade
volumes. Davis and Weinstein use Helpman's and Krugman's theory to find evidence that in-
creasing returns help determine the structure of production and trade. Petri's study of Japanese
'See McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1999) and Parsley and Wei (2000) for the effects of borders on trade volumes.
"Bilateral trade in general is not determined in the perfectly competitive model, unless no two countries have
the same factor prices. The simple form of imperfect competition considered in this paper determines bilateral
trade even when some countries have the same factor prices.
aSee, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985) for models with imperfect competition and more than one
factor.
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trading patterns identifies cross-commodity regressions by relaxing the FPE assumption and by
assuming that home goods are imperfect substitutes for imports. This paper goes further, it ex-
plicitly connects departures from FPE to factor abundance in a general equilibrium model with
a continuum of goods, and uses the implications of that departure to examine the relationship
between factor abundance and trade structure using detailed commodity trade data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 examines
the quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin effect. Section 4 examines the quasi-Rybczynski effect. Section 5
concludes.
1.2 The Model
A. Model Description
The model commences with a many-country version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a
continuum of goods. Countries differ in their relative factor abundance. Factor proportions will
be one force generating international trade. I combine this with the Krugman (1980) model of
intraindustry trade driven by scale economies and product differentiation. Scale economies are
the second force generating international trade. Finally I add 'iceberg' transport costs. The
transport costs will determine the commodity structure of production and trade by generating
a departure from FPE. The model assumptions are set out in detail below.
1. There are 2M countries, M each in the North and South. Southern variables, where
needed, are marked with an asterisk.
2. There are two factors of production supplied inelastically; skilled labor and unskilled
labor earning factor rewards s and w respectively. The total labor supply is 1. The proportion
of skilled labor is denoted by 3. Northern countries are relatively abundant in skilled labor;
/3 > ,3*. A third factor capital is considered at the end of this Section.
3. There is a continuum of industries z on the interval l0,1]. The index z ends up playing a
dual role in the paper, because below z will also be used to rank industries by factor intensity.
Industries with higher z are more skill intensive.
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Production technology, represented by a total cost function TC, is assumed to be identical
Cobb-Douglas in all countries, but there is a fixed cost equal to a units of production:
TC(q(z, i)) = swl-Z( + q(z, i)) (1.5)
Average costs of production decline at all levels of output, although at a decreasing rate.
This cost function has the convenience of generating factor shares that do not depend on factor
rewards. The total cost function also gives the dual role for the index z, because z denotes both
the industry and skilled labor's share of income in that industry. Finally, there is free entry
into each industry, so in equilibrium profits are zero.
6. Costly international trade. There may be a transport cost for international trade. To
avoid the need to model a separate transport sector, transport costs are introduced in the
convenient but special iceberg form: r units of a good must be shipped for 1 unit to arrive in
any other country (r > 1).
B. Equilibrium in an Industry
In general equilibrium consumers maximize utility, firms maximize profits, all factors are
fully employed and trade is balanced. The model solution proceeds in two steps. The first
step is to solve for the partial equilibrium in an arbitrary industry. In particular, I solve for
the share of world production that each country commands, conditional on relative production
costs. I show that countries with lower costs capture larger market shares. The next step is to
show that in general equilibrium, locally abundant factors are relatively cheap. Skilled labor is
relatively cheap in the North, and unskilled labor is relatively cheap in the South. The North
becomes the low-cost producer of skill-intensive goods, and commands larger shares of these
industries. The South is the low-cost producer of low-skill goods, and produces relatively more
of these.
The properties of the model's demand structure have been analyzed in Helpman and Krug-
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markets. The equivalent Southern expression is symmetric.
pq = bY () (M - 1) bY () + MbY* (G) (1.9)
The production and trade structure has also been studied in Helpman and Krugman (1985).7
Each firm produces a different variety of the product. Each country, if it produces in the
industry at all, produces different varieties. Every variety is demanded in every country. Profit
maximizing firms perceive a demand curve that has a constant elasticity, and therefore set price
at a constant markup over marginal cost:8
p() '- _sw (1.10)
With free entry, profits are zero in equilibrium. The pricing rule, the zero profit condition
and the special form of the fixed cost produce an equilibrium where all firms produce the same
quantity of output:
q = q*= a(- 1). (1.11)
WVe now have everything we need to solve for the partial equilibrium in this industry. No-
tation is simplified by defining world income W = M (Y + Y*), the relative price of Northern
goods p = and the expression F = 1 + (M - 1) .1-.y Conditional on relative prices, Equa-
tions 8 and 9 contain four equations in four unknowns n, n*, G and G*. These equations may
not have positive solutions for both n and n*. If they do not, the solution for 7n and n* will
'See Chapter 7.
'The demand curve faced by a firm has a constant elasticity if the set of varieties is of non-zero measure.
!F is the quantity of goods a Northern firm sells in all Northern markets divided by its domestic sales;
F > A4r1 - a.
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either be Equation 12 or Equation 13. If p is low then Equation 12 is the solution; if p is high
then Equation 13 is the solution.l"
=b (Y + Y*) * = 0 if < P = '-aMF (Y* + 1) n p -= 1)(- L 
= ( - 1)' n -Y±YP- L TI2-2M2 + F2 Y
n=0, n* b (Y + Y*) if 2-2a Y + F21
P*a(- 1) L1-aMF(YY + 1J)
(1.12)
(1.13)
If both n and n* are positive, Equations 8, 9 and 11 solve for n , which is given in Equation
14. This expression is derived by dividing the demand Equation 9 by its Southern equivalent;
substituting for q and q* using Equation 11; substituting for G and G* using Equation 8;
and rearranging. The relative number of Northern firms declines in both the relative price of
Northern goods and in the relative size of Southern economies.
n =,-2- 2oM2 Y' + F2 -_ rl-O'MF ( + 1)
n* pj (r2-2rM2 + F2YY - a-7-l-~MF ( + 1)' (1:14)
Equation 14 can be used to solve for a more useful expression, the share v of world revenues
in that industry that accrue to firms in each Northern country. When solving for v, we have to
account for the indirect demand for goods used up in transit. Each Northern firm's revenue is
given by pq, where q is the quantity produced, not the quantity consumed. Equation 15 is the
definition of v. Equation 16 is the solution for v.
npq
M (npq + n*p*q*) (1.15)
'The conditions for p are derived from Equation 14.
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if p (,p]
| _l-mF(y*)+ 2-M2 1 2, 12
v= a L aUP)Trl- Kf7F+72-2VI2F 2 j (1.16)
0 if PEc, oo)
The revenue share v declines in both the relative price of Northern goods p and the relative
size of Southern economies Y-. The sensitivity of market share v to relative price increases
with the elasticity of substitution cr and with the number of countries. To better illustrate this,
Equation 17 gives v evaluated at = 1:
d(-vr 2 (1.17)l-F
Market share responds negatively to relative price. But by Equation 10, relative price is
equal to relative production costs, which depend on factor prices. This generates the role for
factor abundance; I next demonstrate that in general equilibrium, locally abundant factors are
relatively cheap. Therefore the relative price of Northern goods declines with the skill inten-
sity of the industry, and every Northern country captures larger shares of more skill intensive
industries.
C. General Equuilibrium
All factors must be fully employed in all countries in equilibrium. With assumed preferences,
the fnction of world income spent on each industry is invariant to prices and income. With
the assumed production technology, factor shares in each industry are invariant to factor prices.
Skilled labor's share of revenues in industry z is constant and equal to z. The balance goes to
unskilled labor. Equations 18 to 21 are, respectively, the full employment conditions for: skilled
labor in the North; unskilled labor in the North; skilled labor in the South; and unskilled labor
in the South. The left side of each equation is factor demand, the right is factor supply. The
wages of unskilled labor in the South have been normalized to 1. National income equals
national expenditure in every country, so trade is balanced.
1
J-zb (z) Wv (z) dz = . (1.18)
o0
j(1 - z)b (z) Wv (z) dz= 1-P (1.19)
o0
i zb (z) W(i - v (z))dz = a*. (1.20)
0
j(1 -z) b (z) W( - v (z))dz= 1-, *. (1.21)
o
So long as M is finite, the failure of FPE can be demonstrated by contradiction." With
FPE, p (z) = 1 by Equation 10, and v (z) is constant over z by Equation 16. By Equations 18
to 21, relative factor demands in the North equal relative factor demands in the South. But
the relative supply of these factors is not equal by assumption. Therefore we cannot have full
employment equilibrium with FPE.
The North has more skilled labor; the South more unskilled labor. Full employment requires
the North to either (i) have a larger share of skill-intensive industries, or (ii) use skilled labor
' In the limit as M - oc, factor price equalization is again achieved. This is shown by proving that equilibrium
in an arbitrary industry requires production costs to be the same in both the North and the South. The reason
for FPE returning is simple. The domestic market becomes increasingly less important as M gets larger. In the
limit everything is exported, so that transport costs affect locally scarce and abundant factors equally.
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more intensively in each industry than in the South. For the North to obtain a larger share of
skill-intensive industries, Equation 16 requires that p(z) declines in z. By Equation 10, jp(z)
declines in z if and only if < .12 Factor demands obtained by differentiating Equation 5
with respect to factor prices show that for any industry, the North will use skilled labor more
intensively than the South if and only if - < w-. Therefore skilled labor must become relatively
cheap in the North, and unskilled labor relatively cheap in the South. The relative price p (z)
declines in z, and every Northern country's share of world production in an industry rises with
the skill intensity z of the industry. The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.
D. The Separate Contributions of Transport Costs and Monopolistic Competition
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model is a special case of this model with no transport
costs ( = 1) and perfect competition (a = 0 and = oo). It is therefore possible to consider
the separate effects of transport costs ( > 1) and monopolistic competition (a > 0, ar < oo).
In the traditional model with a continuum of goods, Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980)
show that FPE holds if factor endowments are not too dissimilar. Production costs are therefore
the same everywhere because all goods can be produced just as well in any country. With zero
transport costs, there is commodity price equalization. The geographic pattern of production
and trade of a given commodity is therefore indeterminate. Overall patterns of production
and trade are not totally indeterminate, because full employment of both factors requires the
North to produce, on balance, more skill-intensive goods. This prediction is formalized in the
standard HOV factor content of trade equations.
The addition of the transport cost makes the commodity structure of production determi-
nate. The transport cost causes a departure from FPE, and therefore production costs differ
between countries. Locally abundant factors become relatively cheap. Countries have a cost
advantage in goods that intensively use their abundant factor. Consumers only purchase goods
from the cheapest source, inclusive of transport costs. If factor proportions are sufficiently
different, low skill goods in the interval [0, z] will only be produced in the South.l s The cost
advantage that the South enjoys in these goods outweighs the transport cost. High skill goods
'
2This can be proved by differentiating the log of j(z).
,-lf 1:- > 1 ,r2, then this type of equilibrium emerges.
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[z, 1] will only be produced in the North. Intermediate goods i[z, will be produced by all
countries and will not be traded internationally because the transport cost outweighs any pro-
duction cost advantage. The range of these non-traded goods increases as the countries' relative
factor endowments become more similar or as costs of international trade become greater.
The addition of the transport cost to the traditional model therefore leads to the very
stark structure of production and trade illustrated in Figure 4: there is a sharp pattern of
specialization; there is no North-North or South-South trade; there is no intra-industry trade;
and there is no trade at all in commodities with intermediate factor intensities. All trade is
North-South in commodities that embody extreme factor proportions. There are no additional
predictions beyond this. In particular, the bilateral pattern of trade is not determined. These
crisp predictions sit uncomfortably with the hard facts of trade. Much trade flows between
countries with similar factor endowments and much of it appears to be intra-industry trade
(Helpman 1999).
Now consider the case of monopolistic competition but no transport costs. The fixed cost
of production limits the range of products that the market will profitably support. Countries
will specialize in different varieties. When consumers demand a wide spectrum of varieties,
economies of scale generated by the fixed cost will lead to trade. Provided factor endowments
are not too dissimilar, Helpman and Krugman (1985) show that FPE prevails. Production
costs are identical in all countries. There is also commodity price equalization. The geographic
pattern of production and trade of a given commodity is therefore indeterminate. Overall
patterns of production and trade are again not totally indeterminate, because full employment
of both factors requires the North to produce, on balance, more skill-intensive goods. The
standard HOV factor content of trade equations hold but there is now an additional feature;
these equations hold bilaterally. This can be seen in the HOV framework. All of the traditional
assumptions are present. The bilateral prediction is a result of two features of this model:
countries specialize in different varieties; and as long as there is commodity price equalization
consumers will demand the same proportion of world output of each variety of every good
produced. There is North-North and South-South trade, but the net factor content of any of
these trading relationships is zero. Differences between factor endowments and consumption of
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factors is resolved entirely by North-South trade.
Transport costs generate sharp predictions for the location of production, but apart from
ruling out trade between like countries, they generate no predictions for trade between country
pairs.14 Monopolistic competition generates predictions for the total volume and factor content
of bilateral trade, but does not give sharp predictions for where individual industries locate.
Simultaneous consideration of transport costs and monopolistic competition results in both
sharp predictions for the location of production and for bilateral trade in each industry.
Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the influence of transport costs -r, the elasticity of substitution a,
and factor proportions 3,33* in the model. I use as a benchmark a model where transport
costs are moderate ( = 1.05), the substitutability of varieties within an industry is substantial
but far from perfect (o = 5), and the North has twice the skilled labor of the South and
half of the unskilled labor ( = 2, /* = ).15 An increase in transport costs causes countries
to become more diversified and reduces trade (Figure 5). An increase in the elasticity of
substitution between varieties within an industry pushes the model towards the sharp pattern of
specialization that characterizes the perfectly competitive model (Figure 6). Figure 7 illustrates
the sensitivity of the model to relative factor abundance. Larger differences in factor abundance
between the North and the South result in greater specialization in equilibrium.
E. The Three Factor Model
The role of physical capital in trade has traditionally been of great interest. It is possible
to add additional factors to the model. The three-factor model with capital is the same as the
two-factor model but with the following modifications:
1. There are three factors of production supplied inelastically; skilled labor, unskilled labor
and capital earning factor rewards s, w and r respectively. The total factor supply is 1. The
proportions of skilled labor and capital are respectively denoted by P and -y. Northern countries
are relatively abundant in skilled labor and capital; / > 3* and > y*.
"'In this model there is FPE within the two subsets of countries.
"I also set b (z) 1 so that expenditure shares for all industries are identical, and M = 2.
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2. There is a continuum of industries kz on the 2-dimensional simplex. The indices k and
z end up playing dual roles, because k and z will rank industries by capital and skill intensity
respectively.
3. The utility function becomes:
1 1--
U= / b(kz)lnQ(kz)dkdz. (1.22)
0
4. b(kz) is the function of income spent on industry kz. All income is spent:
1 1-z
b(kz)dkdz = 1. (1.23)
0o o0
5. The total cost function becomes:
TC(q(kz, i)) = rkszWl -k-z(a + q(kz, i)) (1.24)
A similar equilibrium emerges. In particular, Equation 16 relating the location of production
to relative costs of production is unchanged. There are now six full employment conditions
analogous to Equations 18 to 21. These are listed in Appendix B. By the same reasoning as
in the 2-factor case, full employment equilibrium with FPE can not occur if factor proportions
differ between countries. With FPE. relative factor demands are the same in every country. But
relative factor supplies are not the same by assumption. However, unless more assumptions are
made about the form of b (kz) it is difficult to comment further on factor rewards. If b (kz) 2
then the function of income spent on each industry is identical, and this task is simplified.
Full employment requires the North to either have larger shares of skill and capital intensive
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industries, or to use skilled labor and capital more intensively in each industry than in the South.
Either of these things requires < 7S and < . In the North, skilled labor and capital
must become cheap relative to unskilled labor. For a given skill intensity z, the relative price
of Northern goods 5(kz) declines with capital intensity k. Given z. every Northern country's
share of world production in an industry is increasing in k. For a given capital intensity k, the
relative price of Northern goods p5(kz) declines with skill intensity z. Given k, every Northern
country's share of world production in an industry is increasing in z.
1.3 The Quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin Prediction
A. Overview and Brief Data Description
Figure 3 illustrates the basis of production and trade based examinations of the model.
Production of skill-intensive goods is concentrated in the North. The more skill-intensive the
good, the greater is this concentration. Given our assumption on preferences, this leads to a very
sharp and convenient prediction for trade. Consider the consumers in any individual country C,
which can be from the North or the South. Consumers in C will purchase some of every variety
of every good, and given the elasticity assumptions, they spend relatively more on varieties that
are relatively cheap. Northern countries produce more varieties of skilled goods, and due to
the behavior of factor prices, do so more cheaply than in the South. Northern countries' share
of C's imports therefore increase with the skill intensity of the industry. The prediction holds
for all of C's bilateral trading relationships. Each Northern country will command a higher
share of C's imports of skilled goods than it will of unskilled goods; their market share will
systematically increase with the skill intensity of the good. The reverse is true for Southern
countries. This is the quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of the model.
The Heckscher-Ohlin prediction can be examined using detailed commodity trade data and
estimates of factor intensity and factor abundance. I use 1998 data from the USA Trade CD-
ROM on US imports classified by detailed commodity and country or origin. There are over
16,000 commodities and 200 trading partners. This data is then mapped into 4-digit US SIC
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codes using a concordance maintained by Jon Haveman.'lt The shares of US imports by SIC
industry are then calculated for each country.
The model assumes that there are no factor intensity reversals. Indeed, a property. of the
model is that factor shares are fixed for each industry. With this assumption, factor intensity
can be consistently ranked using factor share data for just one country. 1 choose US data both
for reasons of availability and because the estimates are likely to be the most satisfactory due to
the US being the largest and most diverse industrial economy. In this paper I mostly consider a
two factor model with skilled and unskilled labor and a three factor model with capital. I also
consider the robustness of the results to the inclusion of raw materials in a four factor model.
All factor intensity data is derived from the US Census of Manufactures for 1992.
In the two factor model I follow Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and measure the skill
intensity of industry Z2 as the ratio of non-production workers to total employment in each
industry. The unskilled labor intensity is u 2 = 1 - z2. In the three factor model I have to
account for the share of capital. Capital intensity k3 is measured by 1- the share of total
compensation in value added. Skill intensity z3 is now equal to z2(1 - k3), and the intensity of
unskilled labor is u3 = u2 (1 - k3). Table 1 lists the 10 industries that most intensively use each
factor and the 10 industries that least intensively use each factor. Many of the most capital
intensive industries are also industries that most intensively use raw materials, generating the
potential for bias if raw materials are omitted from the analysis. In particular, the concern
is that many poor countries may be relatively abundant in raw materials and export simply
transformed raw materials. These exports often end up being classified as capital intensive
manufacturing.
Raw material inputs are derived from detailed data on intermediate inputs by industry. This
data is screened to keep only food, forestry and mining industry output. Raw material intensity
m4 is measured as the value of raw material inputs divided by the sum of raw materials and value
added. The industries that most intensively use raw materials come from the Food, Tobacco,
Wood, Paper, Chemicals, Metals and Non-metallic Mineral Product groupings. Other factor
'"Various concordances are available from the site www.haveman.org.
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intensities need to be adjusted to reflect the share of raw materials. Capital intensity becomes
k4 = k3 (1 - m4 ); skill intensity becomes z4 = z3 (1 - m 4); and unskilled labor intensity is
U4 = u 3 (1 - m 4 ). Tables 2 and 3 report summary statistics for the factor intensity estimates.
The model relates market shares to factor intensity and factor abundance. The abundance
of skilled labor is measured by the human capital to labor ratio from Hall and Jones (1999),
which is based on education levels reported in Barro and Lee (2000). The abundance of capital
is measured by the investment based measure of the capital to labor ratio sourced from Hall
and Jones. The Hall and Jones measures are available for a large number of countries, 123 in
total. Relative GDP per capita is used as an alternative proxy for the abundance of physical
and human capital." Raw material abundance is measured by total land area divided by the
total labor force sourced from the World Bank WVorld Development Indicators 2000 CD-ROM,
a simple but imperfect estimate of the abundance of agricultural and mineral resources. All
measures of abundance are relative to the US. Summary statistics for the factor abundance
measures are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
The final sample includes 123 countries and 370 industries.' 8 In all tests I estimate variations
of Equation 25 for two-factor models, Equation 26 for three-factor models and Equation 27 for
four-factor models. The model does not have a closed-form solution for market share as a
function of factor intensity and factor abundance. I use linear specifications that impose a
very rigid functional form and non-parametric techniques that do not impose a functional form.
The regression estimates are interpreted as conditional expectations of US import market share
given the factor intensities of the industry. Viz is the share that country c commands of US
imports in industry z. z, k and m are, respectively, the skill and capital intensity of industry z.
The subscripts 2, 3 and 4 on the factor intensities denote the number of factors considered when
estimating those intensities. I assume that vz, does not affect the factor intensity of individual
industries; that the production structure of an economy does not affect factor accumulation; and
that any technology differences between countries are orthogonal to the input characteristics of
'
7GDP per capita in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework is a measure of the abundance of all factors relative to
population.
'120 countries when raw materials are included.
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industry.'9
vcz = °ac + CtlcZ2 + Ccz (1.25)
cz - c + aYlcZ3 + C2ck3 + -cz (1.26)
Ucz --= -+ alcZ4 + a2ck4 + Ce3cm4 + Ccz (1.27)
B. The Aggregate North
The first regression is performed at a very aggregate level. I define the North to be any
industrial country with per capita GDP at PPP of at least 50 percent of the US level. The
countries are listed in Table 6. Characteristics of these countries summarized in Table 7 include
high levels of physical and human capital. I calculate the share vz, = E vc for each industry z,
cE North
and regress this on measures of factor intensity. The results for the two-factor case are reported
in Figure 8 and Table 8. The North's market share rises strongly with the skill intensity of
the industry. Each 1 percent increase in skill intensity is estimated to add almost 1 percent
to the North's market share. The predicted shares vary from 46 percent to all of the market.
This coefficient is precisely estimated, with a t-statistic of over 9. I check the robustness of this
result using a non-parametric procedure that estimates the North's market share for a given
skill intensity z, as a weighted average of all market shares. The weights are much greater for
observations that have a skill intensity close to z. 2 ) The results are similar except for a few
industries that use extreme factor proportions. Predicted market shares range from a low of 55
'lThese last two assumptions are, of course, very strong.
'201 estimate the North's share for an industry with skill intensity z by
E iZ,,l I
v,, = z , where w, = exp (-15 [z - zol).
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percent to a high of 88 percent. For most observations, the linear regression line is close to the
non-parametric estimate.
In Table 8 I report the regression results for the 3 and 4-factor models. The results are again
strong. The estimated coefficient on skill increases in magnitude and maintains its statistical
significance, the North's market share increases by almost 2 percent for every 1 percent increase
in skill intensity. The effect of capital is smaller, but is reasonably precisely estimated with
t-statistics of about 5. Each 1 percent increase in capital intensity adds 0.5 per cent to the
North's market share. The North's predicted shares range from 45 percent to all of the market.
C. Individual Country Results
The model performs well for the aggregate North and therefore for the aggregate South.
To ensure that the result is not just driven by a few large trading partners I examine whether
the effect is systematic across individual countries. I firstly rescale the equations to account for
countries being of different sizes. The purpose of this rescaling is so that the coefficients Cc,
1c, ca2c and a3C should be comparable across countries regardless of country size. I define Vcz
as Vcz divided by the average value of Vcz for country c.21 Equations 28 and 29 are estimated
for each country:
Vcz = ac + alcZ3 + Ci2ck3 + 6 cz (1.28)
Vcz = ac + 1alcZ4 + a2ck4 + cL3cm4 + ecz (1.29)
21 A log-transformation can not. be used because many of the import shares are 0. If a large country is simply
the sum of smaller countries then the coefficients will be invariant to country size after the rescaling. If there
really are border effects then large countries will be more diversified, reducing the absolute value of ale, a2c and
f3c.
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The results for the 123 countries in the sample are summarized in Figures 9 to 12. In
Figure 9 plot the estimated coefficients on skill intensity z3 against the human-capital to
labor ratio, a proxy for the abundance of skilled labor. The size of each country's label is
inversely proportional to the standard errors of the coefficient estimate. The estimates are
strongly related to skill abundance. Countries with high levels of human capital tend to export
skill intensive goods, while countries with low levels export goods that more sparingly use skilled
labor. Many of these coefficients are also very large. The equivalent standardized coefficient for
the aggregate North is 3. The results are similar in Figure 10 when raw materials have been
included in the analysis.
The equivalent results for capital reported in Figures 11 and 12 are not as strong. Coefficients
tend to be smaller and less precisely estimated. The 123 coefficients are barely correlated with
per capita GDP, although the more precisely estimated coefficients are positively correlated.
When raw materials are included the results improve. This improvement is likely due to a
reduction in the bias generated by simply transformed raw materials being classified as capital
intensive manufacturing in the 3-factor model. Coefficients tend to be more precisely estimated,
and are positively correlated with capital abundance. This provides stronger evidence that
capital abundant countries do export capital intensive products, and capital scarce countries
export commodities that require little capital in their production. These results are more
thoroughly explored next by pooling the data.
D. The Pooled Regression
The relationship between market shares and factor abundance can be explored more system-
atically by pooling the data. The model predicts that cic, a2c and c3c are positive for countries
that are abundant in skilled labor, capital and raw materials respectively, and negative for
countries where these factors are scarce. The theory provides no closed form solution relating
(alc, a2c and a3c to factor abundance. I model these coefficients according to Equations 30 to
32. This results in the pooled regressions in Equations 33 and 34. The variables skill,, capitalc
and rawc are abundance measures for skilled labor, capital and raw materials in country c.
Countries that are scarce in a factor will capture a large share of industries that use that factor
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sparingly: this implies /1,i3,P5 < O. Countries that are abundant in a factor should capture
a large share of industries that use that factor intensively, implying P2, 34, 6 > 0.
alc = p1 + 32skillc (1.30)
Cf2c = P3 + P4capitalc (1.31)
t3c = P5 + P36ra (1.32)
Vcz = crt + (/31 + 32skillc) z3 (3 + 34capitalc) k3 + eCz (1.33)
V = C (1 +- 32skillc) z4 ± (P3 + P4capitalc) k4 + (P5 ± /36rawc) m 4 + ecz (1.34)
Equations 33 and 34 are estimated by weighted least squares, where the variance weights
axe estimated conditional on country dummies only.22 I measure skill abundance skillc with
the education based measure of human capital taken from Hall and Jones (1999). I measure
capital abundance capitalc with the capital-labor ratio from Hall and Jones. For comparison I
also proxy skill and capital abundance with relative per capita GDP. The results are reported
in Table 9. The results for skilled labor are strong. The exports of countries with low levels
of human capital are extremely tilted towards goods that embody little skilled labor, with
22The variance of V.c is larger for countries that have less diversified exports. These countries typically have
smaller trade volumes. Because the data underlying Vc. are market shares, there is some dependence between
the observations that WLS does not acount for.
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the reverse being true for countries with abundant skilled labor. The same effect is present
for capital, but is weaker. The estimated effect of capital increases after accounting for raw
materials, as expected, but capital abundance appears to be less important than skill abundance
in determining the pattern of specialization.
1.4 The Quasi-Rybczynski Prediction
A. The Miracle Economies
The model predicts that if a country quickly accumulates a factor, then its production
and exports will systematically shift towards industries that more intensively use that factor.
Consider the model when M is large and one of the countries makes the leap from the South
to the North. The world equilibrium is scarcely upset because each country is small relative to
the world. Essentially this country moves from a Southern pattern of production and trade to
a Northern one, while the rest of the world carries on as before. The existence of a number of
growth "miracles" that have joined the ranks of wealthy industrial economies with high levels
of physical and human capital provides an opportunity to examine this quasi-Rybczynski effect.
Ventura (1997) noted that the Rybczynski effect is a critical feature of the growth experience of
the miracle economies. In a closed economy, rapid accumulation of physical and human capital
could lead to falling factor prices. Small open economies can avoid this by shifting production
to more skill and capital intensive industries and exporting the output. If M is large in this
model, factor accumulation in one country has little effect on factor prices either locally or
globally. The Rybczynski effect lets small countries beat diminishing returns.
There are 7 economies that made the cut-off for the North in 1998 that were not present
in 1960: Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Israel, Spain and Ireland. Their substantial
growth in real income relative to the US is shown in Table 10. I add Korea to Table 10 because
of its extremely rapid growth since 1970. I perform the regression defined in Equation 26 for
each country using data for 1960, 1972, 1980, 1990 and 1998. The results summarized in Table
11 are suggestive of the quasi-Rybczynski effect. In 1960 and 1972, market shares for these
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countries tend to be negatively related to skill and capital intensity. As these countries have
grown the coefficients on skill and capital intensity have increased, so that by 1998 the picture
has changed a lot. Positive relationships are more common. The only significant negative
coefficients are for two of the poorer countries in the sample, Korea and Taiwan, and even
there the change in the size of the coefficients makes it clear that production is moving towards
more skill and capital intensive goods. These countries, once firmly rooted in the South, are
developing Northern patterns of production and trade.
The Rybczynski effect can be represented graphically using the same nonparametric tech-
nique used in Figure 8. Some of the most pronounced changes in export structure occurred in
two groups of countries that experienced unprecedented growth rates substantially attributable
to rapid accumulation of human and physical capital: Japan and the four 'miracle' economies
of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. 23 Between 1960 and 1998 Japan's income levels
went from 54 per cent of Western-European levels to 114 per cent, with equality occurring in
1981. The four miracle economies moved from 21 per cent of European income levels in 1960 to
72 percent in 1998. The Rybczynski prediction would be a convergence in the production and
trade structures of these economies towards European patterns. The prediction is supported
by the data. Figures 13 to 15 show the trade structure of the four miracle economies, Japan
and Western Europe in 1960, 1980 and 1998. Convergence is apparent. In 1960 the trade of
the then poor miracle economies was concentrated in goods that used little skilled labor, while
Europe captured larger market shares for skilled goods. Japan, with an intermediate income
level, had a production structure neatly between the two. As the relative income levels of the
economies converged, so too did their production structures. .Japan's looks almost the same as
Europe by 1980, the same time as income levels converged. The miracle economies appear to
be systematically approaching Europe in terms of both income and trade structure, although
as a group they still have some way to go. The results for physical capital are less pronounced,
consistent with Table 11. Japan's exports actually appear to be less capital intensive now than
in 1960.
2:'For analysis of the growth experience of the Asian miracles, see Young (1992. 1993), Lucas (1993), and
Krugman (1994).
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B. The Pooled Rybczynski Regression
To more formally test for the Rybczynski effect I estimate Equation 33 in differences:
AVc = Aoc + (A/1 + f2Askillc) Z3 + (A/3 + / 4 Acapitalc) k3 + Aecz (1.35)
The Rybczynski prediction implies that 2, /34 > 0; countries that have accumulated skilled
labor and physical capital faster than the rest of the world will see their production and trade
move towards skill and capital intensive industries. The parameters AO1 and A'3 3 may not be
zero because US factor proportions may have moved relative to the rest of the world and because
Askillc and Acapitalc are measured relative to the US. To maximize the number of comparable
industries, I calculate AV, Askillc and capitalc using a start date of 1972 rather than 1960.
The end date is 1998. For Askillc I use two education based measures from Barro and Lee
(2000). One is the change in average years of college education between 1970 and 1995, and the
other is the change in average total years of education for the same period. For Acapitalc I use
investment based measures of the capital-labor ratio from the Penn World Tables in 1972 and
1992. For comparison, I also use the more widely available change in relative GDP per capita
as a proxy for both Askill, and Acapitalc.24
The sample consists of 317 industries, with 45 countries when factor data is used to esti-
mate factor accumulation, and 103 countries when income data is used as a proxy for factor
accumulation. The results are reported in Table 12. The results for capital weakly suggest
that countries that rapidly accumulate capital move towards more capital intensive industries.
All of the education based variables are insignificant. The human capital measures may not
work well because years of formal education take no account of education quality, and because
formal education accounts for only a fraction of human capital development.25 Krueger and
Lindahl (2000) suggest that measurement error in first-differenced cross-country education data
is extreme. This would bias downwards the estimated coefficients. Table 13 is suggestive of this
24This of course ignores any role for technological explanations of cross-country growth differences, and makes
strong assumptions about how factors are accumulated.
2
'5See, for example, Lucas (1993) and Barro and Lee (2000).
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explanation. Changes in education levels are barely correlated with per capita income growth.
It is hard to believe that human capital accumulation is truly uncorrelated with growth. The
quality of education can to some extent be controlled for by the inclusion of scores from stan-
dardized tests administered internationally. 2 6 The problem is that the number of countries in
the sample contracts greatly. When test scores are added to the regression, the coefficients
on human capital accumulation increase but remain insignificant. Interestingly, the education
quality measure itself is a significant explanator of the change in production structure. Coun-
tries that perform highly on international test scores have moved towards more skill intensive
industries. Students in Japan and the Asian miracle economies perform best in these tests.
The income based measures are large and highly significant for both skill and capital inten-
sity. Fast growing countries see their trade move towards skill and capital intensive industries.
The coefficients ,2 and 04 should be the same size as in the levels regression on Equation 33.
The skill coefficient is the same size, but the capital coefficient is now noticeably larger. One
possible explanation for the increase in the capital coefficient is that there is an omitted factor
that is partly controlled for by the differencing employed in the Rybczynski regression.
1.5 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is to derive and examine predictions of the factor proportions model in
commodity markets. All that is required to make these predictions are two reasonable general-
izations of the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. I introduce transport costs and monopolistic
competition. This produces two main predictions. There is a quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin effect and
a quasi-Rybczynski effect. Both of these predictions can be examined using detailed import
data for just one country. The Heckscher-Ohlin prediction finds strong support in the data.
The role of skill abundance appears to be especially pronounced. There is also support for the
R.ybczynski effect for fast-growing countries. Factor proportions appear to be an important
determinant of the structure of production and international trade.
2
'The data on international tests of students in mathematics and science are contained in Barro and Lee
(2000). I sum the two scores and divide the sum by its mean of 1000.
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Table 2: Factor Intensity Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Z2 0.29 0.12 0.08 0.83
z3 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.39
Z4 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.39
u2 0.71 0.12 0.17 0.92
U3 0.34 0.12 0.05 0.63
U4 0.32 0.13 0.02 0.62
k3 0.52 0.14 0.19 0.93
k4 0.47 0.14 0.09 0.87
m4 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.86
Table 3: Correlation and Variance of Factor Intensities
Z2 Z3 k3 U3 Z4 k4 U4 m4
Z2 0.015
Z3 0.723 0.005
k3 0.115 -0.555 0.019
U3 -0.579 0.057 -0.862 0.014
Z4 0.685 0.976 -0.567 0.086 0.006
k4 0.187 -0.301 0.669 -0.620 -0.175 0.020
U4 -0.434 0.163 -0.840 0.909 0.259 -0.351 0.016
m4 -0.134 -0.303 0.321 -0.200 -0.484 -0.474 -0.559 0.030
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Factor Abundance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
H/L 0.567 0.168 0.325 1.017
K/L 0.286 0.323 0.004 1.236
GDPPC 0.272 0.280 0.015 1.132
LAND/L 1.841 3.195 0.004 18.20
Table 5: Correlation and Variance of Factor Abundance
H/L K/L GDPPC LAND/L
H/L 0.028
K/L 0.799 0.105
GDPPC 0.807 0.917 0.078
LAND/L -0.054 0.058 -0.025 10.21
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Table 6: North and South
North South
Australia' Algeria 3 Guatemala 2 Papua New Guinea 4
Austria' Angola 3 Guinea 3 Paraguay 2
Belgium' Argentina 3 Guinea Bissau 3 Peru 2
Canada' Bangladesh 3 Guyana 3 Philippines 2
Denmark' Barbados 3 Haiti 3 Poland 4
Finland2 Benin3 Honduras 2 Portugal 3
France' Bolivia 2 Hungary 4 Romania 3
Germany' Botswana 4 India2 Russia 4
Hong Kong' Brazil 3 Indonesia 3 Rwanda 3
Iceland' Burkina Faso 3 Ivory Coast 3 Saudi Arabia 3
Ireland' Burundi 3 Jamaica 3 Senegal 3
Israel 2 Cameroon 3 Jordan 3 Seychelles 3
Italy2 Cape Verde 4 Kenya 2 Sierra Leone4
Japan' Central African Republic 3 Korea 3 Slovakia 4
Luxembourg 4 Chad3 Lesotho 4 Somalia 4
Netherland' Chile3 Madagascar 3 South Africa 3
New Zealand' China 2 Malawi 2 Sri Lanka3
Norway' Colombia' Malaysia 3 Sudan4
Singapore3 Comoros 4 Mali 3 Surinam 3
Spain' Congo, Democratic Republic 3 Malta 3 Swaziland 4
Sweden' Congo, Republic 3 Mauritania 3 Syria2
Switzerland' Costa Rica3 Mauritius 2 Tanzania 3
Taiwan 2 Cyprus 3 Mexico 2 Thailand'
United Kingdom' Czech Republic 4 Morocco 3 Togo3
Dominican Republic 2 Mozambique3 Trinidad and Tobago3
Ecuador 2 Myanmar 3 Tunisia 3
Egypt3 Namibia 4 Turkey 2
E1l Salvador 3 Nicaragua 3 Uganda 3
Fiji3 Niger3 Uruguay 3
Gabon 3 Nigeria 3 Venezuela 2
Gambia 4 Oman 4 Yemen 4
Ghana 3 Pakistan 3 Zambia 2
Greece' Panama 2 Zimbabwe 2
Notes: ' denotes countries that are included in all Rybczynski regressions.
2 denotes countries with factor data for Rybczynski regressions but no test scores.
3 denotes countries with per capita GDP data only for Rybczynski regressions.
4 denotes countries that are not included in any Rybczynski regression.
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Table 7: Characteristics of North and South
H/L K/L GDPPC LAND/L
North 0.79 0.83 0.75 1.74
South 0.51 0.15 0.15 1.75
Table 8: Regression for the Aggregate North
(Dependent Variable: vz)
2 Factors 3 Factors 4 Factors
Constant 0.39*** 0.12 0.05
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
2 0.93***
(0.10)
Z3 1.90***
(0.22)
k3 0.54***
(0.11)
z4 2.00***
(0.22)
k4 0.64***
(0.11)
m4 0.60***
(0.12)
Observations 370 370 370
R2 0.19 0.18 0.24
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. denote
significance at the 1,5,10 and percent level.
Table 9: Pooled Regression of Import Share on Factor Intensities
(Dependent Variable:
Variable
z
Skill*z
GDPPC*z
k
Capital*k
GDPPC*k
(1)
-16.66***
(1.32)
23.26***
(1.83)
-0.77***
(0.26)
1.30***
(0.37)
m
Raw*m
Country
Dummies Yes.
(2)
-9.52***
(0.62)
17.87***
(1.05)
-1.91**
(0.31)
3.66***
(0.53)
Yes.
Vcz)
(3)
-16.72***
(1.14)
24.13***
(1.60)
-1.17***
(0.24)
2.22***
(0.35)
-17.26
(45.32)
0.38***
(0.04)
Yes.
(4)
-7.74***
(0.49)
15.46***
(0.84)
-1.85***
(0.27)
3.80***
(0.45)
-16.98
(45.32)
0.37***
(0.03)
Yes.
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Countries 124 123 120 120
Obs. 45,880 45.510 44.400 44.400
Note: standard errors in parentheses. denote significance at
1,5, 10 percent level.
-
Table 10: Per Capita Real Income Relative to the US
1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
Japan 0.30 0.56 0.66 0.79 0.79
Singapore 0.17 0.23 0.46 0.65 0.82
Hong Kong 0.23 0.35 0.57 0.82 0.70
Taiwan 0.13 0.17 0.29 0.45 0.54
Korea 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.37. 0.46
Ireland 0.33 0.39 0.45 0.51 0.73
Spain 0.32 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.55
Israel 0.35 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.58
Table 11: Regression Coefficients of Market Share on Factor Intensities
(Dependent Variable:
Country
Japan
Japan
Factor
Skill
Capital
Singapore Skill
Singapore Capital
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Taiwan
Israel
Israel
Ireland
Ireland
Spain
Spain
Korea
Korea
Skill
Capital
Skill
Capital
Skill
Capital
Skill
Capital
Skill
Capital
Skill
Capital
Average Skill Coefficient
Average Capital Coefficient
Number of Industries
Note: robust standard errors in parc
1960 1972
-3.16 -1.62***
(3.78) (0.57)
5.76* -1.59***
(3.23) (0.31)
n.a. 3.04
(4.94)
n.a. -1.48
(1.08)
-6.88** -6.64***
(2.76) (1.63)
-1.95* -3.05***
(2.35) (0.71)
-11.15*** -7.12***
(2.91) (1.70)
-6.18** -3.71**
(2.49) (0.74)
-11.76*** -2.06
(2.67) (1.75)
-5.35** -0.31
(2.28) (0.76)
n.a. 1.35
(2.87)
n.a. 3.06
(2.15)
n.a. -3.35**
(1.48)
n.a. 1.13
(0.92)
-14.91* -10.53***
(8.90) (2.67)
-12.62* -4.65***
(7.61) (1.10)
-9.57 -3.37
-4.07 -1.33
151 376
mntheses. denote significance at 1.5,10 percent level.
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Vcz)
1980
1.22*
(0.71)
-0.95***
(0.36)
-0.01
(2.11)
-0.91
(0.74)
-5.77***
(1.24)
-2.00***
(0.63)
-5.48***
(0.82)
-3.07***
(0.47)
0.61
(4.25)
-1.50
(1.82)
-0.39
(1.97)
5.70*
(2.95)
-1.23
(1.56)
2.60*
(1.33)
-6.70***
(1.23)
-2.20***
(0.63)
-2.22
-0.29
376
1990
3.10***
(0.78)
-0.40
(0.42)
1.75
(2.48)
0.54
(0.81)
-5.68**
(1.52)
-2.56***
(0.82)
-4.07***
(0.70)
-3.12***
(0.45)
4.25***
(1.61)
0.03
(0.65)
3.04***
(1.15)
6.25*
(3.41)
-0.78
(1.69)
1.24
(0.81)
-5.39***
(1.19)
-3.06**
(0.56)
-0.47
-0.14
366
1998
5.66***
(0.95)
0.47
(0.49)
8.30***
(2.42)
0.36
(2.10)
-2.54
(1.92)
-1.44
(1.18)
-1.97**
(0.85)
-2.54***
(0.54)
7.46***
(2.66)
1.41
(0.96)
4.80***
(1.39)
6.58**
(3.07)
-1.2
(1.60)
0.62
(0.92)
-3.52**
(1.66)
-3.26**
(1.49)
2.12
0.28
370
-
-
rTable 12: Pooled Rybczynski Regressions
(Dependent Variable: AVc)
Variable
z
ACollege*z
AEducation*z
Test Scores*z
AGDPPC*z
k
ACapital*k
AGDPPC*k
(1)
2.57***
(0.52)
-0.63
(3.49)
0.61 **
(0.24)
1.26*
(0.71)
(2)
-18.85**
(7.93)
2.14
(3.73)
21.54***
(7.98)
0.77***
(0.28)
1.47*
(0.83)
(3)
2.47***
(0.46)
1.89
(4.42)
0.62**
(0.24)
1.23*
(0.70)
(4)
-19.48**
(7.91)
7.93
(6.44)
22.30***
(7.93)
0.76***
(0.28)
1.51*
(0.81)
(5)
0.99**
(0.46)
16.31***
(3.32)
-0.05
(0.23)
6.70***
(1.62)
Country
Dummies Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Countries 45 21 45 21 103
Obs. 14,265 6657 14,265 6657 32.651
Note: standard errors in parentheses. ' denote significance at 1,5,10 percent
level.
Table 13: Correlation of Education and Capital Growth with GDP
Arelgdppc7298 Aedn7095 Acol7095 AK/L7292
Arelgdppc7298 1
Aedn7095 -0.01 1
Aco17095 0.13 0.24 1
AK/L7292 0.33 -0.08 0.12 1
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Figure 1: Heckscher-Ohlin Effect for Germany and Bangladesh
Skill Intensity and US Import Shares in 1998
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Figure 2: Rybczynski Effect for the Asian Miracle Economies*
Combined US Import Shares 1960-1998
(*Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea)
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Figure 3: The Location of Production
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Figure 4: Location of Production in DFS Model With Transport Costs
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Figures 9 to 12: Coefficients from Regressions of Country's Share of US Imports by Industry (V,,cz) on
Factor Intensity of Industry
Figure 9: Skill Intensity; 3 Factor Model
WLS regression line: Coeff.= -19.75 + 27.89H/L
standard errors: (1.42) (1.97)
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Figure 10: Skill Intensity; 4 Factor Model
WLS regression line: Coeff.= -19.55 + 27.66H/L
standard errors: (1.47) (2.04)
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Figure 12: Capital Intensity, 4 Factor Model
WLS regression line: Coeff.= -2.30 + 3.80KIL
standard errors: (0.27) (0.40)
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Figure 14: Skill Intensity and US Import Shares in 1980
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Figure 15: Skill Intensity and US Import Shares in 1998
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TChapter 2
NAFTA's Impact on North
American Trade
Summary 2 Chapter 2 focuses on the effect of preferential tariff liberalization on the direction
of trade and suggests that NAFTA has had a substantial impact on North American trade. The
chapter focuses on where the US sources its imports of different commodities from. It identi-
fies the impact of NAFTA by exploiting the substantial cross-commodity variation in the tariff
preference given to goods produced in Canada and Mexico. Canada and Mexico have greatly
increased their share of US imports of commodities for which they enjoy a tariff preference.
For commodities where no preference is given, Canada's share has declined while Mexico's has
increased much more modestly. The empirical results suggest that Canada's share of US imports
may have declined without NAFTA, rather than increased, while the growth in Mexico's share of
US imports would have been much slower. Useful products of the empirical work are estimates
of consumer willingness to substitute between different varieties of the same commodity. The
estimated average elasticities of substitution range from 5 to 7.
2.1 Introduction
On January 1, 1994 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United
States, Canada and Mexico entered into force. It has been described as the most comprehensive
51
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free trade pact, short of a common market, that has ever been negotiated between regional
trading partners (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993). It is by far the largest free trade pact outside of
the European Union and is the first reciprocal free trade pact between a substantial developing
country and developed economies. Further expansion is in prospect following the April 2001
Summit of the Americas. Ministers from almost all North and South American nations have
been directed to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005.
Since the advent of NAFTA, one of the more striking occurrences has been the rapid increase
in Mexican trade. Mexico has become one of the US's largest trading partners, accounting for
11.2 percent of total US imports in 2000, up from 6.9 percent 1993. Only Canada (18.8 percent)
and Japan (12.0 percent) account for larger shares (Figures 1 and 2). Mexico exports more to
the US than Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and the Philippines combined.
Krueger (1999, 2000) attributes this increase not to NAFTA. but to the real depreciation of
the Mexican exchange rate in 1994 and to Mexico's reduction of tariffs and quantitative trade
restrictions against all of its trading partners.
By contrast, this paper finds that NAFTA has had a substantial impact on North American
trade. It focuses on where one of the NAFTA partners, the United States, sources its imports
at a very detailed commodity level. Figure 3 shows that Mexico's share of US imports has
increased most rapidly in commodities for which it has been given the greatest tariff preference,
defined as the difference between the tariff on a commodity sourced from Mexico and the
US's Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate for the same commodity; the tariff applicable to
countries that have normal trade relations with the US. While the simple average of Mexico's
share of US imports in over 7,000 commodities increased from 5.0 to 7.0 per cent since NAFTA,
its average share in over 1500 commodities for which no special preference is afforded increased
more modestly from 4.2 to 5.0 per cent. Up to half of the increase in US imports sourced from
Mexico can be attributed to its preferential treatment.
The simple average Canadian share of US imports has also increased by 2.0 percentage
points since the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) came into effect in 1989. Figure 4 also
suggests that Canada's share of US trade was increased by the FTA/NAFTA. For commodities
where the MFN tariff rate is zero, and therefore there is no preference for Canada, Canadian
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rgoods now account for a smaller share of US imports than they did in 1989. But where there
is a preference, Canada now captures substantially larger shares of US imports. Although US
tariffs are typically low, trade appears to be quite sensitive to even small trade preferences.
Preferential Trade Areas (PTAs) have received a great deal of analytical and empirical at-
tention since Viner (1950) distinguished between the trade creationary and trade diversionary
effects of preferential tariff liberalization. Much of this attention is driven by the ambigu-
ous welfare implications of PTA's. Favorable effects ("trade creation") result from removing
distortions in the relative price between domestically produced commodities and commodities
produced in other members of the PTA. Unfavorable effects ("trade diversion") come from the
introduction of distortions between the relative price of commodities produced by PTA mem-
bers and non-members (Frankel, Stein and Wei 1996). Research has also been motivated by
the question of whether PTA's help or hinder movement towards the first best of global free
trade (for example, Baldwin 1996, Levy 1997, Bagwell and Staiger 1999).
This paper seeks to shed light on the extent to which actual PTA's affect trade. Most
studies examining the impact of actual PTA's are either simulations or examine changes in
the direction of aggregate trade between countries or regions following the introduction of the
PTA. Examples of these for NAFTA are Gould (1998) and Garces-Diaz (2001). Gould finds that
NAFTA has increased US-Mexico trade, but has had no effect on US-Canada or Mexico-Canada
trade. Garces-Diaz finds that Mexico's export boom is not attributable to NAFTA.
Research at an industry level includes two papers on NAFTA by Krueger (1999, 2000), who
studies North American trade patterns at the 3 and 4 digit industry level. Krueger finds no ev-
idence that NAFTA has had any impact on intra-North American trade. Head and Ries (1999)
study the industry rationalization effects of tariff reductions and find that on balance, NAFTA
has had little net effect on the scale of Canadian firms. In studies of MERCOSUR, the PTA
formed between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, Yeats (1997) finds that the fastest
growth in intra-MER.COSUR. trade was in commodities in which members did not display a
comparative advantage, inferred from the lack of exports of these commodities outside MER-
COSUR. This was interpreted as evidence of the trade diversionary effects of MERCOSUR.
Chang and Winters (2000) look to Brazilian import price data to examine whether preferential
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tariffs have depressed the prices of excluded countries' exports. They find the rather extraordi-
nary result that due to the tariff preference, Argentinian competition has led to significant and
substantial reductions in American, Japanese, Korean and most other countries' export prices
to Brazil.
I attribute the difference in this paper's findings from Krueger(1999, 2000) to two factors.
Firstly, two more years of data have become available. More importantly, this paper looks to
the level of commodity detail at which tariffs are set, rather than at a more aggregate level.
This allows the use of better tariff data. Much of the cross-commodity variation in tariff
preferences occurs even within quite detailed industry sectors. Focussing at the commodity
level minimizes the loss of variation in tariff preferences, reduces the problems of aggregating
across commodities, and allows for a greater ability to control for unobserved factors that may
be affecting North American trade.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of NAFTA. Section 3
introduces a simple general equilibrium model of preferential trade liberalization that is used to
motivate the empirical examination of NAFTA. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents
and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 NAFTA
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that came in to effect on January
1, 1989 provided for the gradual elimination of tariffs and for reductions in non-tariff barriers
to trade. By January 1, 1998, all US and Canadian tariffs on goods produced in the US and
Canada were eliminated, with the exception of over-quota tariffs on several hundred agricultural
products (primarily sugar, dairy, poultry, peanuts and cotton). The FTA was incorporated into
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on January 1, 1994. NAFTA was designed
to increase trade and investment among the United States, Canada and Mexico. Almost all
tariffs on goods originating in the US, Canada and Mexico will be eliminated by January 1,
2008. NAFTA did not affect the phase-out of tariffs for US-Canada trade under the FTA.
Some US tariffs applied to Mexican goods were, however, transitionally increased by NAFTA.
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Prior to 199, Mexico as a developing country was a beneficiary of the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP). Under the GSP, the US and other developed countries allow duty-free
access for the output of developing countries in several thousand commodities, accounting for
just under 10 per cent of Mexican exports to the US in 1993. With NAFTA, the US ceased to
confer GSP benefits on Mexico.
Outside of Europe, NAFTA covers a much larger amount of trade than any other regional
trading arrangement (Baldwin, 1996), and there are prospects for NAFTA's incorporation into a
free trade agreement covering the all of the Americas. While NAFTA is not a "deep" integration
like the European Union and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement, it contains provisions that go beyond mere removal of tariffs and quantitative trade
restrictions, including disciplines on the regulation of investment, transportation and financial
services, intellectual property, government purchasing, competition policy, and the temporary
entry of business persons (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993).
2.3 A Simple Model and the Empirical Strategy
This paper seeks to exploit the cross-commodity variation in the tariff preference that is afforded
to goods originating in NAFTA partners to identify NAFTA's effect on North American trade
patterns. The paper focuses on where the US sources its imports of different commodities from.
It seeks to explain changes in US import patterns using the preference afforded to commodities
of Canadian and Mexican origin. The idea is that where Canada and Mexico are afforded no
special preference (where the MFN tariff rate is zero, for instance), NAFTA's only impact should
come through a general equilibrium effect on factor prices, or through reductions in "border
effects" due to NAFTA provisions that go beyond tariff liberalization. For commodities where
NAFTA causes a preference to open up for Canadian and Mexican goods, the preference should
have an additional effect causing US consumers to substitute towards Canadian and Mexican
goods and away from other sources of supply. This effect can be illustrated using a simple
model.
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A. Model Description
There are n almost identical countries each producing a continuum of commodities. All
commodities are produced competitively using labor under constant returns to scale. Trade is
driven by preference for variety and output being differentiated by country of origin. Initially
every country imposes ad-valorem tariffs on all imports, which are rebated as a lump sum to
consumers. Pairs of countries then enter into preferential trading agreements whereby each
country lowers tariffs on imports from its partner country, but does not adjust the tariff on
imports from other countries. This causes consumers to substitute towards the output of the
preferred country and away from all other sources of supply, including domestic production.
The model assumptions are set out in detail below.
1. There are n almost-identical countries, denoted by C = l, .., n.
2. There is 1 factor of production, labor, supplied inelastically. The total labor supply in
each country is 1.
3. There is a continuum of industries z on the interval [0,1]. In each country, every industry
produces a commodity competitively under constant returns to scale. Each commodity has a
unit labor requirement of 1.
4. Consumers in each country are assumed to have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences
over the output of each industry with the function of income spent on industry z being b (z)
(Equation ). Expenditure shares for each industry are therefore constant for all prices and
incomes. All income is spent so the integral of b (z) over the interval 10,1] is 1 (Equation 2).
1
U = b(z) n Q (z) dz. (2.1)
0
b (z)dz = 1. (2.2)
0
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5. An Armington demand structure is assumed. Each commodity is not a homogeneous
good but is instead differentiated according to the country of origin. Q (z) can be interpreted as
a sub-utility function that depends on the quantity of each variety of z consumed. I choose the
CES function with elasticity of substitution ad > 1. Let qD (z,) denote the quantity consumed
of commodity z produced in country C. Q (z) is defined by Equation 3:
aZ
Q (z) = EqD (zc) ) (2.3)
6. Tariffs. Initially every country imposes an ad-valorem tariff t (z) on imports of commodity
z, which is rebated as a lump-sum to consumers.
7. Preferential Trade Agreements. The world divides itself into symmetric trade blocs.
Pairs of countries enter into preferential trading agreements whereby each country levies a tariff
tP (z) < t (z) on imports from its partner country, but does not adjust the tariff on imports
from other countries.
B. Equilibrium Prior to Preferential Trade Agreements
In general equilibrium, consumers maximize utility, firms maximize profits, all labor is fully
employed and trade is balanced. Because of the symmetry of countries and the assumptions
of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, all wages and prices (exclusive of tariffs)
are equal in all countries and can be normalized to 1. Tariffs raise the price paid by domestic
consumers for imported goods to 1 + t (z). Let T1 (z) denote tariff revenue collected in country 1
on imports of commodity z, let Y1 denote income in country 1, and qf (z,) denote consumption
in country 1 of commodity z produced in country c. From the perspective of country 1, income
is equal to the sum of factor income (wages) plus tariff revenue.
T1 (z) = St (z) q () . (2.4)
col
57
1Y = 1 + T1 (z) dz. (2.5)
0
Consumers in country 1 maximize utility subject to expenditure being equal to income. Due
to the unit substitution elasticity between industries, the share of income spent on commodity
z is constant at b (z):
qf (, ) + qf (Z) (1 + t (z)) = b () Y (2.6)
c#l
Differentiating with respect to consumption levels of each commodity, we find that the tariff
on imported goods causes domestic consumers to substitute towards domestically produced
varieties. The amount of substitution depends on the level of the tariff and on the elasticity of
substitution between varieties:
VZ, c- 1 ( )= (1 + t ()) ' (2.7)
qD (zc)
Equilibrium conditions for all other countries are symmetric. All countries produce equal
quantities of each commodity. Tariffs raise the price of imported goods relative to domestically
produced varieties, and consumers substitute away from imported goods accordingly. Table 1
summarizes the share by value (exclusive of tariffs) or, equivalently, the share by quantity that
each country's production commands of Country l's consumption and imports of a arbitrary
commodity z. Countries 2,..,n each account for a n 1 share of country l's imports of each
commodity. Their share of consumption of z in country 1 is declining in the tariff and in the
elasticity of substitution.
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Table 1: Source of Country 1's Consumption and Imports (Share)
Country of Origin Consumption of z Imports of z
1
2
3, .. , n
-n-1 >+t1'.(n-l(+t(z)-z 
I I
n-l+(l+t(z))7 <n
1 1
n-l+(l+t(z)) Z n
1
n-1
1
n-i
C. Equilibrium After Preferential Trade Liberalization
Now assume that the world divides itself into the symmetric preferential trade areas
detailed in the model description, including one between countries 1 and 2. Due to the symmetry
of the arrangement, all wages and therefore prices (exclusive of the tariffs) remain equal and
can be normalized to 1. But the definition of tariff revenue in Equation 4 and Equations 6 and
7 from the consumer's utility maximization problem need to be modified to account for the
preferential trade liberalization:
T1 (z) = t (z) qD (2) + Et (z) q ()
c>2
ql (zl) + q (2)(1 + t (Z)) + Eqf (Zc)(1 + t (z)) = b(z) Y
c>2
Vz, Vc>2 : q ( = (1 + t ()) z q (z) = (1 + t (z)) z
qD (Zc) qD (Z2)
(2.8)
(2.9)
(2.10)
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The "market share" effects of the preferential liberalization from the perspective of country
1 are summarized in Table 2. Now that the output of country 2 receives preferential tariff's in
country 1, country 2 accounts for an increased share of country 's consumption and imports of
each commodity. A fraction of the increased share of consumption comes from a reduced share
of domestic suppliers ("trade creation"), and the rest comes from a reduced share of goods
imported from countries outside the trade bloc ("trade diversion"). The size of the increased
share in an arbitrary industry z depends positively on the size of the tariff preference in the
1+t(Z)industry l+tP((), and positively on the elasticity of substitution between varieties of z. That
country 2 experiences no decrease in shares of country 's markets is a relatively special result of
this model, driven by the preservation of relative factor prices due to the continuing symmetry
of countries.
Table 2: Source of Country 's Consumption and Imports (Share) After
Liberalization
Country of Origin Consumption of z Imports of z
1l+(ltP(z)) Z (n-2)(1+t(z)) -Z
2 a, 1 11( litP(z)) 0-LZ+(n>2) (1±t(z)) -a 1J.(n-2)( >t) 0 n-)
3, .. , n +t(z) +-2 n-
D. Empirical Strategy
This model forms the basis of the empirical examination of the effects of NAFTA. Con-
trolling for , the change in where the US sources its imports of different commodities after
the FTA/NAFTA should be systematically related to the tariff preference that the US gives
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to goods of Canadian or Mexican origin. The empirical work commences with reduced form
equations of the form:
Yczt = XIz.-rct + c.prefcz + cactprefcz + ecz (2.11)
where c denotes countries of origin, z denotes commodities and t time; Yczt is either the
share of US imports of commodity z that is sourced from country c (shareczt), or the growth
rate of total US imports of commodity z (gzt); xcz is a set of controls with potentially time-
varying effects 7rcd; and prefcz is the preference in the year 2000 that the US affords to country
c for imports of commodity z. The act are the time-varying effects of the tariff preference,
and are normalized to zero in 1988 for Canada and in 1993 for Mexico (the years prior to
Canada's entry into the FTA and Mexico's entry into NAFTA respectively). For c = Canada
and t > 89, at measures the impact of NAFTA's preference for Canadian goods on the share
of US imports sourced from Canada. For c = Mexico and t > 94, at measures the impact
of NAFTA's preference for Mexican goods on the share of US imports sourced from Mexico.
Because the preference is phased in, at should grow through the transition period.
For the growth rate regressions, where gzt is the dependent variable, act measures the impact
of NAFTA's preference on the growth of trade, a measure of trade creation due to NAFTA.
2.4 Data
Since 1989 the US has collected its trade data according to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTS), a schedule that is now standard for many countries up to the 6 digit level. The US
International Trade Commission (USITC) maintains a database at the 10 digit level of US
imports classified by commodity, country of origin, import program, month and port of arrival.
US tariffs are almost invariably set at the 8 digit level, comprising about 14,000 commodities by
the year 2000. Fine changes in detailed commodity classifications often lead to discontinuity in
the data. To reduce this I focus at the 8 digit rather than the 10 digit level. I am able to track
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bilateral trade in 7,091 commodities annually from 1989 to 2000. Because Canada entered into
the FTA with the US in 1989. it is necessary to collect data for earlier years. Prior to 1989, trade
data was collected according to a different commodity schedule, the TSUSA. Concordances are
available for this data, but I am only able to track 4203 commodities continuously from 1980
to 2000. Almost all of the extra attrition occurs between 1988 and 1989.
For each year I calculate the share of US imports of each commodity measured by customs
value (that is, exclusive of tariffs, freight and insurance) that originate in each of the trading
partners of the US. The change in the simple average of Canada's and Mexico's share of US
imports by commodity is summarized in Table 3 for three periods: 1989 to 1993; 1993 to 2000;
and 1989 to 2000. In 1989 to 1993 during the FTA but before NAFTA, the average of Canada's
US import market shares increased by 1.3 percentage points, while Mexico's increased by a
more modest 0.3 percent. From 1993 to 2000, Canada's average share increased by a further 0.7
percent, while Mexico's increased by a further 2.0 percent. The data also contains information
on physical quantities imported for a large number of the commodities, allowing the calculation
of unit price variables. Where possible, I calculate the price of Canadian and Mexican goods
relative to the price of goods sourced from the rest of the world, denoted rpczt.
The tariff rates are also available from the USITC. While most tariffs are ad-valorem, there
are still several hundred specific tariffs applied. The USITC calculates the ad-valorem equivalent
of any specific tariffs. The distribution of MFN tariffs in 2000 is illustrated in Figure 5. The
simple average of tariff rates is low at 6 per cent, but importantly there is a large amount of
dispersion, with the standard deviation of MFN tariff rates being 12 per cent. Under NAFTA,
all but a few hundred of these tariffs have been eliminated for Canada and are in the process
of being eliminated for Mexico, creating a large variation in the preference given to goods of
Canadian and Mexican origin (Figure 6).
Complicating matters somewhat was the existence of preferential treatment for some Mex-
ican and Canadian goods prior to the FTA/NAFTA. In 1965, Canada and the US negotiated
the Auto-Pact, allowing duty-free trade in many automotive goods. The Auto Pact was incor-
porated into the FTA. Mexico was also a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), under which the US (and other developed countries) gave developing countries preferen-
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tial access to their markets. The US gave duty free access to the output of developing countries
for several thousand commodities, although goods where developing countries may have gained
most from preferential access were often excluded (notably many agricultural items and textiles,
clothing and footwear), and the preference could easily be removed under "competitive needs
limitations" to the GSP. Upon entry into NAFTA, Mexico was no longer entitled to claim GSP
benefits for trade with the US.
For each commodity, I calculate the preference afforded to Canadian and Mexican goods as
the MFN tariff rate applicable to that commodity in January 2000 less the tariff rate applicable
to Canadian and Mexican goods respectively. The distribution of these preferences is illustrated
in Figure 6. To account for the pre-existing preference under the GSP for Mexico, I define the
variable GSP93 that takes a value equal to the MFN tariff rate if Mexico was entitled to
GSP preference for that commodity in 1993, and zero otherwise. To similarly account for the
preference given to Canada under the Auto Pact, I define the variable AP89 that takes a value
equal to the MFN tariff rate if goods could be entered duty free under the Auto Pact, and zero
otherwise.
The preferences given to Canadian and Mexican production are systematically related to
some of the characteristics of the commodities. This is to some extent evident from Figures 3
and 4 which, for Canadian goods especially, show a systematic negative relationship between the
preference and Canada's market share. Given that the most protected sectors are agriculture
and simple manufactures like textiles, apparel and footwear, the highest preferences are mostly
in these sectors. This is especially true for simple manufactures because much agricultural
protection was preserved under NAFTA. Where the preference exceeds 20 percent for either
Mexican or Canadian goods, 70 percent of the commodities are textiles, clothing or footwear,
17 percent are agricultural commodities, and the remainder are light trucks, glassware, bags,
brooms and cheap watch movements.
The NAFTA preferences are strongly biased towards commodities in which developed coun-
tries have a comparative disadvantage. This effect was investigated by examining the relation-
ship between the relative price of Canadian output and the NAFTA preferences for Canadian
goods. The unit import price data contains some very extreme values that suggests that much
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of it is not measured well. Given that most tariffs are ad-valorem, customs agents may be less
concerned with physical quantities. To reduce the impact of extreme observations, extreme
values were discarded in some regressions, the cut-off alternatively being where the absolute
value of the log relative price equalled 2 or 1. Table 4 reports results from regressing lnrpczt
on In prefcz in 1993 and 2000. The results strongly suggest that the relative price of Canadian
goods was and is substantially higher in commodities where there is a large NAFTA preference.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that NAFTA preferences are skewed towards "developing
country goods" and suggests that NAFTA may have caused Canada to expand its share of US
imports in commodities where it is a relatively high cost producer.
2.5 Results
A. Market Share Results
Figures 7 and 8 plot Mexico's and Canada's share of US imports classified according to the
year 2000 preference extended by the US to goods produced in Mexico and Canada respectively.
The "no treatment" goods are those for which the tariff for Mexican or Canadian goods is
identical to the tariff applied to goods from countries with which the US has normal trade
relations. The "low treatment" goods are those for which Mexico and Canada benefited from
a preference of up to and including 10 per cent in January 2000, while the "high treatment"
goods are those where the preference exceeded 10 percent. The Figures are very suggestive. In
the five years prior to Mexico's entry into NAFTA, its share of all three classes of commodities
is fairly stable, although there is a gradual decline for the no-treatment commodities and a
slight increase for the high-treatment goods, especially in 1993. Some of this increase in high-
treatment goods could be ascribed to anticipation effects, because NAFTA was foreshadowed
in 1989 and the agreement was ratified in 1993. After 1993 there is a very pronounced change
in Mexico's exports to the US. Its share of the high-treatment commodities jumps immediately,
and almost trebles by 2000. Mexico's share of low-treatment goods begins to increase in 1995,
and has increased by 75 per cent by 2000. Its share of no-treatment goods increases much more
modestly, rising only 20 per cent by 2000.
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Figure 8 for Canada is less stark but is still very suggestive. The unfortunate thing about
Figure 8 is that discontinuity in the data between 1988 and 1989 has led to a particularly severe
loss of data for the high treatment goods, consistent with anecdotal evidence that fine changes
to classifications are often used as a protectionist device. But the FTA/NAFTA's effect is still
apparent. In the years leading up to the FTA, Canada's share of US imports was declining,
although this trend had largely abated by the late 1980s. Since 1988, Canada's share in the
no-treatment goods has continued to decline, and is 4.3 per cent lower in 2000. However, its
share of low-treatment and high-treatment goods has recovered sharply, up by 33 and 30 per
.cent respectively by 2000.
Table 5 and Figures 9 to 14 report OLS estimates of Equation 11. The time-varying effect
of the tariff preference has been normalized to zero in the year preceding entry into the FTA or
NAFTA. The dependant variable is shareczt. Because of saturation of the model with respect to
c, the model is estimated separately for Canada and Mexico, the dependence between eczt across
countries has not been exploited. Column 1 and Figure 9 report results for 1980-2000 of a fixed
effects model with dummies for each commodity and for each year. The only control variable
is the Auto Pact variable. The interaction between the NAFTA preference and Canada's share
of US imports only becomes significantly positive from 1996. By 2000, each 1 per cent of
preference has led to an increase of 0.25 percentage points in Canada's share of US imports. A
little disturbingly, there is a significant negative relationship in two of the pre-treatment years,
1982 and 1983. Column 2 and Figure 2 report results for the same years but instead of time
and commodity dummies the model includes interactions between time dummies and 97 HTS
2-digit industry dummies. The industries are listed in Table 7. The estimated NAFTA effect is
faster and stronger, with significant positive effects at the 10 per cent level evident from 1992.
By 2000, each 1 per cent of preference has led to an increased share of 0.38 percentage points.
The significant negative relationships reported in column 1 for 1982 and 1983 have disappeared.
Column 3 and Figure 11 is the same model as column 1 and Figure 9 but estimated for
the 7091 commodities that could be tracked continuously from 1989. The time-varying effect
of the preference has been normalized to zero in 1989. The estimates are similar to column 1
but significant positive effects are evident from 1992. This may be due to the inclusion of many
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more high-treatment commodities. Column 4 and Figure 12 are the analogues of column 2 and
Figure 10, only using the 7091 commodities from 1989 to 2000. The estimated effects are again
very similar. In all four regressions, each 1 per cent of preference is associated with an increase
of 0.24 to 0.38 percentage points in Canada's share of US imports. In a later section of this
paper, estimates of the elasticity of substitution a are sought.
Column 5 and Figure 13 report results for 1989-2000 of a fixed effects model for Mexico
with dummies for each commodity and for each year. The only control variable is the GSP
variable. The interaction between the NAFTA preference and Mexico's share of US imports
becomes significantly positive in the first year of NAFTA, 1994. By 2000, each 1 per cent of
preference has led to an increase of 0.30 percentage points in Mexico's share of US imports.
Column 6 and Figure 14 report results for the same years but instead of time and commodity
dummies the model includes interactions between time dummies and 97 HTS 2-digit industry
dummies. The estimated NAFTA effect is slower and weaker, with significant positive effects
at the 10 per cent level evident from 1996. By 2000, each 1 per cent of preference has led to an
increased share of 0.18 percentage points.
Columns 7 and 8 report estimates of the effect of Mexico's loss of GSP preferences upon
its entry into NAFTA, from the same regressions reported in columns 5 and 6 respectively.
The regression reported in Column 7 contains only commodity and time dummies, while the
regression in Column 8 contains all interactions between time and 2-digit industry dummies.
The GSP effect is normalized to zero in 1993, the last year that Mexico could claim GSP benefits.
Column 7 suggests that prior to NAFTA, Mexico was increasing its share in commodities for
which the US conferred GSP benefits. Upon Mexico's entry in to NAFTA and the loss of GSP
benefits, this trend is immediately reversed. Each 1 per cent loss of GSP benefits is associated
with a 0.25 percentage point decline in Mexico's share of US imports. The estimates in Column
8 are similar in magnitude but less precisely estimated.
B. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
The results reported in Figures 7 to 14 and Table 5 suggest that NAFTA preferences have
had a pronounced effect on the source of US imports. But the results do not tell us whether this
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increased share for Canada and Mexico is the result of new international trade displacing US
domestic production ("trade creation") or whether it is simply displacement of imports from
other sources ("trade diversion"). The model presented in Section 3 predicts that it will be a
little of both. I do not have data on US production matched to the tariff schedule, so instead
I examine direct evidence of trade creation by performing OLS regression on Equation 11 with
gzt, the growth rate of total US imports of commodity z, as the dependent variable. Greater
trade liberalization, even if it is preferential, should produce faster growth in trade.
Unfortunately the data in the model is systematically biased against finding evidence of
trade creation from NAFTA, and therefore is biased towards concluding that Canada's and
Mexico's increased share of US trade is predominantly trade diversion. The reason for this is
that the data fails to account for the evolution of the normal trade relations or MFN tariff
rate over time. For most commodities, but not all, this has been decreasing. The problem.
with the uneven evolution of the MFN rate is that Mexico and Canada may enjoy the greatest
preferences in commodities where the US has been slowest to adjust its MFN rate. Greater
preferences for Canada and Mexico may not only reflect greater preferential trade liberalization,
but slower trade liberalization on a multilateral basis. It is therefore unclear that the growth
rate in trade at the commodity level should be positively related to NAFTA preferences.
Table 6 reports the regression results. The regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 are the
analogues of those in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5. They seek to find any evidence of faster trade
growth following Canada's entry into the FTA in 1989. There is no evidence of this effect.
Columns 3 and 4 are the analogues of columns 5 and 6 in Table 5, and were produced to find
evidence of faster trade growth following Mexico's entry into NAFTA. Again there is none. But
for the reasons argued above, this should not be taken as evidence that NAFTA has only had
a trade diversionary effect.
C. Elasticity of Substitution
The model presented in Section 3 can be used to derive estimates of the typical elasticity
of substitution a (z) using the observed change in Canadian and Mexican market shares. This
parameter is of interest because it helps determine the effect of trade impediments on the volume
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Tof trade and because it is a critical ingredient of welfare analysis of trade liberalization. If we
define R (z) to be country 2's share of country 's imports of commodity z post-PTA divided
by its pre-PTA share then from Tables 1 and 2 we can derive Equation 12:
n -+ an t r(z) ) (2.12)
Estimates of the mean a, can be obtained by running OLS on Equation 12, where R (z)
is calculated using 1988 and 2000 shares for Canada and 1993 and 2000 shares for Mexico. It
should be noted that the regression can only be run for commodities where trade is observed
in both years. The second term in Equation 12 should be reasonably close to zero if n is large,
but in any case it can be approximated by noting that n - 1 is the inverse of the pre-PTA share
that country 2 obtained of country l's imports of commodity z. The 1988 Canadian shares and
1993 Mexican shares are used to estimate this second term. The results are reported in Table
8. Without the adjustment for the second term, OLS regressions suggest an average elasticity
of 4.8 in the case of goods imported from Canada and 6.3 for goods imported from Mexico.
With the adjustment, the estimated elasticities are slightly higher at 5.2 and 7.0 respectively.
The higher estimates for Mexico suggest that Mexican output is more concentrated in less
differentiated commodities.
These elasticities of substitution suggest that consumers are quite willing to substitute be-
tween different varieties of the same commodity. One implication of this willingness to substitute
is that small costs to international trade, whether due to natural barriers such as transport costs
or artificial barriers such as tariffs, will have a large effect on trade volumes. With a substitution
elasticity of 5, the simple average US tariff of 6 per cent will reduce consumption of imported
varieties relative to domestic varieties by 25 per cent. With a substitution elasticity of 7, this
reduction in relative consumption is 33 per cent.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to identify an effect for NAFTA by focusing on where the United States sources
its imports of different commodities from. NAFTA appears to have a substantial effect on North
American trade. Mexican and Canadian shares of US imports have increased most rapidly in
commodities where the greatest NAFTA preference was conferred, even though Canada appears
to be a high cost producer of many of these commodities. The Canadian share of US imports
declined in commodities where it was not given a new preference, while the Mexican share
increased much more modestly. The results of this paper suggest that trade flows are very
sensitive to even small tariff preferences. The NAFTA preferences can be used to estimate
how willing consumers are to substitute between different varieties of the same commodity.
The implied average substitution elasticity is approximately 5 for the commodities produced
by Canada and 7 for Mexico. Consumers are quite willing to substitute between different
varieties of the same commodity. Small changes in trade impediments, whether due to natural
or non-natural barriers, could therefore have substantial effects on international trade volumes.
Preferential liberalization will have substantial effects on the direction of trade.
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Table 3: Change in Canada's and Mexico's Share of US Imports 1989-2000
(Simple average of market share in 7032 commodities)
Period Change in Canada's Change in Mexico's
Average Share Average Share
1989-1993 0.013 0.003
(0.002) (0.001)
1993-2000 0.007 0.020
(0.002) (0.002)
1989-2000 0.020 0.023
(0.003) (0.002)
Notes: standard errors appear in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates
Table 4: NAFTA Preferences and the Relative Cost of Canadian Goods
Year 1989 1989 1989 2000 2000 2000
LHS Variable lrpct lrp rpzt lrpt lrpczt lrpcZt
Keep if I lrpczt 1<2 I lrpct 1<1 1 lrp,, 1<2 I lrpc l<1
RHS Var.
pref,, 1.353 1.749 1.07 0.501 0.847 2.022
(0.360) (0.216) (0.149) (0.269) (0.152) (0.379)
R2 0.003 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.006 0.011
N 4577 3986 2970 6429 5385 2659
Notes: robust errors appear in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates
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Table 5: Effect of NAFTA Preferences 1
Canada Mexico
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pref Pref Pref Pref Pref Pref GSP GSP
Preference*1980 -0.054 0.063
Preference*1 981
Preference*1982
Preference*1983
Preference*1984
Preference*1 985
Preference*1 986
Preference*1 987
Preference*1 988
Preference*1 989
Preference*1990
Preference*1991
Preference*1 992
Preference*1993
Preference*1994
Preference*1995
Preference*1 996
Preference*1 997
Preference*1 998
Preference*1999
Preference*2000
(0.077)
-0.062
(0.094)
-0.152
(0.088)
-0.249
(0.085)
-0.062
(0.083)
-0.076
(0.081)
-0.075
(0.084)
0.014
(0.084)
-0.031
(0.090)
-0.057
(0.075)
-0.058
(0.075)
0.062
(0.079)
0.104
(0.080)
0.106
(0.075)
0.122
(0.076)
0.214
(0.079)
0.229
(0.078)
0.236
(0.079)
0.252
(0.078)
0.262
(0.086)
(0.140)
-0.074
(0.152)
-0.045
(0.152)
-0.114
(0.148)
0.013
(0.145)
0.005
(0.140)
-0.022
(0.141)
0.041
(0.143)
0.033
(0.155)
0.054
(0.138)
0.094
(0.138)
0.238
(0.149)
0.235
(0.146)
0.224
(0.140)
0.242
(0.142)
0.279
(0.143)
0.300
(0.144)
0.339
(0.145)
0.355
(0.144)
0.378
(0.150)
0.035
(0.034)
0.030
(0.033)
0.092
(0.033)
0.102
(0.034)
0.108
(0.032)
0.142
(0.032)
0.179
(0.033)
0.221
(0.035)
0.249
(0.035)
0.249
(0.034)
0.242
(0.037)
0.040
(0.064)
0.076
(0.064)
0.183
(0.068)
0.173
(0.068)
0.186
(0.066)
0.225
(0.069)
0.210
(0.069)
0.264
(0.072)
0.308
(0.072)
0.317
(0.070)
0.286
(0.069)
-0.037
(0.029)
-0.005
(0.026)
-0.008
(0.026)
-0.012
(0.025)
0.058
(0.024)
0.154
(0.029)
0.210
(0.029)
0.194
(0.029)
0.219
(0.027)
0.282
(0.031)
0.297
(0.030)
0.020
(0.067)
0.011
(0.064)
0.002
(0.061)
-0.023
(0.064)
0.023
(0.068)
0.111
(0.077)
0.139
(0.08)
0.108
(0.078)
0.151
(0.076)
0.220
(0.08)
0.182
(0.081)
0.574
(0.109)
0.440
(0.107)
0.274
(0.096)
0.106
(0.1 00)
0.178
(0.091)
0.190
(0.091)
0.097
(0.097)
0.124
(0.099)
0.143
(0.094)
0.217
(0.099)
0.249
(0.098)
0.693
(0.175)
0.478
(0.181)
0.344
(0.182)
0.107
(0.190)
0.178
(0.186)
0.130
(0.193)
0.017
(0.205)
0.064
(0.199)
0.095
(0.199)
0.158
(0.200)
0.189
(0.197)
Time and Commodity
Dummies
Time*lndustry
Dummies
Yes No Yes
No Yes
No
No Yes
Yes No Yes No
No Yes No Yes
Years
ConmmoditiP. s
21 21 12 12
4203 4203 7091 7091
12 12
7091 7091
12 12
7091 7091
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.The dependent variable is the share of US imports
by commodity sourced from Canada or Mexico respectively in the given year. Preference in columns 1 through 6
is the difference between the MFN tariff rate and the tariff applicable to goods of Canadian or Mexican origin in
January 2000. Preference in columns (7) and (8) is Mexico's loss of GSP benefits upon entry into NAFTA.
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TTable 6: Effect of NAFTA Preferences 2
Trade Creation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preference*1 980
Preference*1 981 -0.030 1.225
(0.736) (0.836)
Preference*1 982 0.806 1.431
(0.738) (0.805)
Preference*1 983 0.295 1.538
(0.736) (0.819)
Preference*1 984 0.405 1.384
(0.695) (0.797)
Preference*1 985 2.228 2.237
(0.859) (0.857)
Preference*1 986 1.156 1.760
(0.677) (0.788)
Preference*1987 -1.698 0.881
(0.702) (0.771)
Preference 1 988
Preference*1 989 -0.417 1.150
(0.922) (1.061)
Preference*1 990 0.232 0.816 -0.173 -0.429
(0.597) (0.659) (0.295) (0.442)
Preference*1 991 -0.219 0.583 -0.147 -0.943
(0.609) (0.702) (0.293) (0.444)
Preference*1992 0.134 1.419 0.526 0.095
(0.593) (0.673) (0.297) (0.430)
Preference*1 993 -0.002 1.412
(0.587) (0.632)
Preference*1 994 -0.335 0.277 -0.374 -1.164
(0.606) (0.687) (0.296) (0.437)
Preference*1 995 -0.211 0.927 0.141 -0.082
(0.601) (0.672) (0.283) (0.416)
Preference*1996 -0.306 0.603 0.032 -0.244
(0.582) (0.643) (0.267) (0.402)
Preference*1 997 0.204 1.452 0.292 -0.084
(0.582) (0.649) (0.280) (0.421)
Preference*1 998 -0.149 0.798 0.097 -0.268
(0.591) (0.659) (0.274) (0.406)
Preference*1 999 -0.092 0.698 0.085 -0.551
(0.571) (0.632) (0.267) (0.406)
Preference*2000 0.120 1.364 0.032 -0.572
(0.567) (0.607) (0.262) (0.376)
Time and
Commodity
Dummies Yes No Yes No
Time*industry
Dummies No Yes No Yes
Years 21 21 12 12
Commodities 4203 4203 7091 7091
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.The dependent vanable is the share
of US imports by commodity sourced from Canada or Mexico respectively in the given year.
Preference is the difference between the MFN tanff rate and the tanff applicable to goods of
Canadian or Mexican ongin in January 2000.
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Table 7: 2-digit HTS Industries and Value of Imports in 2000
Industry Description $m
1 LIVE ANIMALS 1929
2 MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL 3393
3 FISH AND CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS AND OTHER AQUATIC INVERTEBRATES 8153
4 DAIRY PRODUCE; BIRDS' EGGS; NATURAL HONEY; EDIBLE PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NEE 1064
5 PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NESOI 540
6 LIVE TREES AND OTHER PLANTS; BULBS, ROOTS AND THE LIKE; CUT FLOWERS AND ORNAMEJ 1160
7 EDIBLE VEGETABLES AND CERTAIN ROOTS AND TUBERS 2649
8 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUTS; PEEL OF CITRUS FRUIT OR MELONS 3919
9 COFFEE, TEA, MATE AND SPICES 3200
10 CEREALS 806
11 MILLING INDUSTRY PRODUCTS; MALT; STARCHES; INULIN; WHEAT GLUTEN 313
12 OIL SEEDS AND OLEAGINOUS FRUITS; MISCELLANEOUS GRAINS, SEEDS AND FRUITS; INDUSTI 853
13 LAC; GUMS; RESINS AND OTHER VEGETABLE SAPS AND EXTRACTS 493
14 VEGETABLE PLAITING MATERIALS AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTS, NESOI 53
15 ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR CLEAVAGE PRODUCTS; PREPARED EDIBLE 1398
16 EDIBLE PREPARATIONS OF MEAT, FISH, CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS OR OTHER AQUATIC INVE 2202
17 SUGARS AND SUGAR CONFECTIONERY 1480
18 COCOA AND COCOA PREPARATIONS 1408
19 PREPARATIONS OF CEREALS, FLOUR, STARCH OR MILK; BAKERS' WARES 1778
20 PREPARATIONS OF VEGETABLES, FRUIT, NUTS, OR OTHER PARTS OF PLANTS 2678
21 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PREPARATIONS 1247
22 BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR 8339
23 RESIDUES AND WASTE FROM THE FOOD INDUSTRIES; PREPARED ANIMAL FEED 615
24 TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SUBSTITUTES 1127
25 SALT; SULFUR; EARTHS AND STONE; PLASTERING MATERIALS, LIME AND CEMENT 2097
26 ORES, SLAG AND ASH 1641
27 MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION; BITUMINOUS SUBST. 133730
28 INORGANIC CHEMICALS; ORGANIC OR INORGANIC COMPOUNDS OF PRECIOUS METALS, OF Ri 6909
29 ORGANIC CHEMICALS 30495
30 PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 12177
31 FERTILIZERS 1714
32 TANNING OR DYEING EXTRACTS; TANNINS AND DERIVATIVES; DYES, PIGMENTS AND OTHER C 2716
33 ESSENTIAL OILS AND RESINOIDS; PERFUMERY, COSMETIC OR TOILET PREPARATIONS 2750
34 SOAP ETC.; LUBRICATING PRODUCTS; WAXES, POLISHING OR SCOURING PRODUCTS; CANDLE 1493
35 ALBUMINOIDAL SUBSTANCES; MODIFIED STARCHES; GLUES; ENZYMES 1248
36 EXPLOSIVES; PYROTECHNIC PRODUCTS; MATCHES; PYROPHORIC ALLOYS; CERTAIN COMBUE 267
37 PHOTOGRAPHIC OR CINEMATOGRAPHIC GOODS 2734
38 MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 4367
39 PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF 19088
40 RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF 10187
41 RAW HIDES AND SKINS (OTHER THAN FURSKINS) AND LEATHER 1168
42 ARTICLES OF LEATHER; SADDLERY AND HARNESS; TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS AND SIMILAR 7157
43 FURSKINS AND ARTIFICIAL FUR; MANUFACTURES THEREOF 331
44 WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL 15453
45 CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK 175
46 MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, ESPARTO OR OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND V 302
47 PULP OF WOOD OR OTHER FIBROUS CELLULOSIC MATERIAL; RECOVERED (WASTE AND SCRA 3381
48 PAPER AND PAPERBOARD; ARTICLES OF PAPER PULP, PAPER OR PAPERBOARD 15390
49 PRINTED BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, PICTURES AND OTHER PRINTED PRODUCTS; MANUSCRIPTS, 3491
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50 SILK, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRICS THEREOF 294
51 WOOL AND FINE OR COARSE ANIMAL HAIR, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRICS THEREO 414
52 COTTON, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRICS THEREOF 2113
53 VEGETABLE TEXTILE FIBERS NESOI; YARNS AND WOVEN FABRICS OF VEGETABLE TEXTILE FIE 185
54 MANMADE FILAMENTS, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRICS THEREOF 2103
55 MANMADE STAPLE FIBERS, INCLUDING YARNS AND WOVEN FABRICS THEREOF 1171
56 WADDING, FELT AND NONWOVENS; SPECIAL YARNS; TWINE, CORDAGE, ROPES AND CABLES 851
57 CARPETS AND OTHER TEXTILE FLOOR COVERINGS 1469
58 SPECIAL WOVEN FABRICS; TUFTED TEXTILE FABRICS; LACE; TAPESTRIES; TRIMMINGS; EMBR( 592
59 IMPREGNATED, COATED, COVERED OR LAMINATED TEXTILE FABRICS; TEXTILE ARTICLES SUI' 792
60 KNITTED OR CROCHETED FABRICS 1005
61 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, KNITTED OR CROCHETED 26405
62 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, NOT KNITTED OR CROCHETED 32801
63 MADE-UP TEXTILE ARTICLES NESOI; NEEDLECRAFT SETS; WORN CLOTHING AND WORN TEXTI 4583
64 FOOTWEAR, GAITERS AND THE LIKE; PARTS OF SUCH ARTICLES 14854
65 HEADGEAR AND PARTS THEREOF 1246
66 UMBRELLAS, SUN UMBRELLAS, WALKING-STICKS, SEAT-STICKS, WHIPS, RIDING-CROPS AND P 284
67 PREPARED FEATHERS AND DOWN AND ARTICLES THEREOF; ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS; ARTICLES 1092
68 ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS, MICA OR SIMILAR MATERIALS 3433
69 CERAMIC PRODUCTS 4074
70 GLASS AND GLASSWARE 4393
71 NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR SEMIPRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS 29923
72 IRON AND STEEL 14665
73 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL 14150
74 COPPER AND ARTICLES THEREOF 5113
75 NICKEL AND ARTICLES THEREOF 1541
76 ALUMINUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF 9187
78 LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF 213
79 ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF 1342
80 TIN AND ARTICLES THEREOF 339
81 BASE METALS NESOI; CERMETS; ARTICLES THEREOF 1107
82 TOOLS, IMPLEMENTS, CUTLERY, SPOONS AND FORKS, OF BASE METAL; PARTS THEREOF OF E 4554
83 MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES OF BASE METAL 4686
84 NUCLEAR REACTORS, BOILERS, MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; PARTS THEREO 180908
85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS AND R 186099
86 RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY LOCOMOTIVES, ROLLING STOCK, TRACK FIXTURES AND FITTINGS, AN 1828
87 VEHICLES, OTHER THAN RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY ROLLING STOCK, AND PARTS AND ACCESSO 163854
88 AIRCRAFT, SPACECRAFT, AND PARTS THEREOF 18167
89 SHIPS, BOATS AND FLOATING STRUCTURES 1178
90 OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC, MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, MEDICA 36620
91 CLOCKS AND WATCHES AND PARTS THEREOF 3485
92 MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF 1423
93 ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF 839
94 FURNITURE; BEDDING, CUSHIONS ETC.; LAMPS AND LIGHTING FITTINGS NESOI; ILLUMINATED 23833
95 TOYS, GAMES AND SPORTS EQUIPMENT; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF 19254
96 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES 2865
97 WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND ANTIQUES 5858
TOTAL 1168447
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Table 8: Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution
Canada Canada Mexico Mexico
Years 1989-2000 1989-2000 1993-2000 1993-2000
Adjustment No Yes No Yes
RHS Var.
ln(l+t)-ln(l+t P ) 4.83 5.22 6.27 7.01
(0.54) (0.74) (0.87) (0.94)
ln(l+AP89) -9.28 -14.82
(2.37) (3.21)
ln(l+GSP93) -7.20 -7.82
(1.71) (1.84)
N 4814 4814 3038 3038
Notes: robust standard errors appear in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates
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Figure 1: Share of Total US Imports 1989-2000
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Figure 2: Share of Total US Imports 1989-2000
1989-1993: Canada-US Free
Trade Agreement
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Figure 3: Mexico's Share of US Imports Classified by Tariff Preference
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Figure 4: Canada's Share of US Imports Classified by Tariff Preference
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Figure 5: US Import Tariffs in 2000
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Figure 6: US Import Tariffs: NAFTA Preferences in 2000
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Figure 7: NAFTA's Impact on Mexico's Share of US Imports
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Figure 8: NAFTA's Impact on Canada's Share of US Imports
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Figure 9: Impact of 1% NAFTA Preference on Canadian Share of US
Imports*
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
(*Central Estimate plus 90% Confidence Interval; Model includes commodity and time
dummies; 4203 commodities tracked from 1980 to 2000)
Figure 10: Impact of 1% NAFTA Preference on Canadian Share of US
Imports*
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
(*Central Estimate plus 90% Confidence Interval; Model includes industry and time
dummies and their interactions; 4203 commodities tracked from 1980 to 2000)
82
0.8
- 0.6
- 0.4
rw
0.2
E 0.0
Un
: -0.2
' -0.4
-0.6
-0.8
0.8
0.6 -
0.4 ,
0.2)0.2
0
0.0 E
C)
-0.2 =
-0.4 o
-0.6
-0.8
0.8
.. 0.6
L 0.4
m 0.2
0
E 0.0
U3
: -0.2
0
o -0.4
-0.6
-0.8
... ......................... ...............................~.. ...........:. ....:''................ ......... ........... ...... ... .... ........... ........... . . . .
:..~~~~~~~~~~~~~..'.~.... .......
.5wf--
_ > /M *,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~··., · w*/ * 
i............................~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... ........
_ . . ...... ......... .. t..,.. . . ...... . .... .. ............ ... . _ ...... _. . . _, . . . . .,
_. . . ........... ..... . ....... .. ........... .. .... ....... .. ... ...... .. . .......... ..... . .. ..... . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . .
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·
0.8
0.6 _
-
0.4 h
Co
0.2 
-
o
-0.4 -0
-0.6
-0.8
mmrr___________·_____·r-· · r·-·-rrmrr·r·1 r-···\·r-r·-·1.·r ·r·r·r·r··rr·r-r-r·r · rr·-rr·mrrml·r·r·m·m·r·r·rrrr·r
.... .... ... .... ... .... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... .... ... .... ... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .. . .... .. .... ... .... .... ... .... ... .... ...
r~~~~~~~~~~~.........
.. ................ .. . .. . . . .. . ... .... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... .. ... . . ... ... ...
~~~~~~~~~. . . . . . . . .
...... 
~ ..... ~ . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . ...... ~ ,, w . [ ......--...
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
- ------ 
IFigure 11: Impact of 1% NAFTA Preference on Canadian Share of US
Imports*
0.8
- 0.6
E 0.4
o 0.20
E 0.0
M -0.2C
o
O-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
(*Central Estimate plus 90% Confidence Interval; Model includes commodity and time
dummies; 7091 commodities tracked from 1989 to 2000)
Figure 12: Impact of 1% NAFTA Preference on Canadian Share of US
Imports*
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(*Central Estimate plus 90% Confidence Interval; Model includes industry and time
dummies and their interactions; 7091 commodities tracked from 1989 to 2000)
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Figure 13: Impact of 1% NAFTA Preference on Mexican Share of US
Imports*
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
(*Central Estimate plus 90% Confidence Interval; Model includes commodity and time
dummies; 7091 commodities tracked from 1989 to 2000)
Figure 14: Impact of 1% NAFTA Preference on Mexican Share of US
Imports*
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Chapter 3
International Trade Costs and the
Structure of International Trade
Summary 3 Chapter 3 examines the effect of international trade costs on the volume of trade.
It extends the model in Chapter 1 to allow trade costs to vary by country and commodities. An
arbitrary country imports more commodities from countries where bilateral trade costs are lower,
and imports more from larger countries. It also sources specific commodities disproportionately
from trading partners that possess in relative abundance the productive factors that are used
relatively intensively in the production of that commodity. Useful products of the empirical
examination are estimates of the willingness to substitute between different varieties of goods
within an industry. The implied elasticities of substitution are mostly high, typically ranging
between 6 and 16. With such high elasticities of substitution, small costs to international trade
will sharply reduce trade volumes.
3.1 Introduction
Empirical models of international trade based on "border effects" and "gravity" best describe
observed trade patterns. Countries trade much more with themselves than they do with each
other (McCallum 1995, Wei 1996, Helliwell 1998), and the international trade that does oc-
cur tends to be with proximate countries (See Deardorff 1985 for a survey). These effects are
not purely confined to quantities; the dispersion of prices for similar goods increases with the
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distance, even within national boundaries (Engel and Rogers 1996, Parsley and Wei 2000).
The effects of borders and distance are considered to be much greater than can be explained
by observable costs of trade. Explanations of the low level of international trade include the
existence of informal trade barriers such as the weak enforcement of international contracts
(Anderson and Marcouiller 1999), inadequate information about international trading oppor-
tunities (Portes and R.ey 1999), and the importance of business and social networks (Rauch
1999). Only Hummels (1999b) suggests that observed trade costs are most of the story.
This paper investigates whether observed trade costs are a substantial contributor to the
low level of international trade. It develops a model where transport costs, country size and
factor proportions dictate the international pattern of specialization. Transport costs cause
locally abundant factors to be relatively cheap, which attracts industries that intensively use
those factors. The pattern of specialization in production in turn determines the commodity
structure of international trade. Conditional on the pattern of specialization in production,
transport costs and consumer willingness to substitute between goods determine the volume of
international trade.
These predictions are examined using detailed bilateral trade data for the US. Trading
partner size, observed transport costs, and the abundance of skilled labor have very substantial
effects on the structure and volume of international trade. Although the model does not yield
closed-form solutions for the structure of trade, one important parameter of the model can be
estimated; the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods within an industry. Estimates
of this elasticity are typically 6, consistent with Hummels (1999b), but can be much higher
depending on how observations with zero trade are modelled. With these elasticities, even small
international trade costs, whether due to natural or artificial barriers, will have a pronounced
effect on international trade volumes. The median normal-trade-relations tariff applied by the
US is 5 percent. The median international freight cost by country of origin and commodity
is equal to 11 percent of the Free On Board (FOB) value of the commodity. If there was an
elasticity of substitution of 6 across all goods, these trade costs would reduce trade volumes by
60 percent relative to a nearly-frictionless world.
The structure of the model is most closely related to Romalis (2000), which was in turn
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developed from the models in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980) and Helpman and
Krugman.' The closest theoretical paper to this is due to Deardorff (2001), who uses a general
framework that encompasses all perfectly competitive models to study "locational comparative
advantage". Deardorff proves that a negative correlation must exist between relative autarky
prices in the exporting country, inclusive of incipient trade costs, and bilateral trade flows.
The closest empirical papers are Hummels (1999b), who finds that observed trade costs explain
much of the low volume of trade in many goods, and Romalis (2000), who uses trade costs
to find that factor proportions are an important determinant of the commodity structure of
international trade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 describes the
data and discusses the empirical models. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
A. Model Description
The model is an extension of Romalis (2000). It is a many-country version of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model with a continuum of goods. Countries differ in their relative factor abundance.
Factor proportions will be one force generating international trade. I combine this with the
Krugman (1980) model of intraindustry trade driven by scale economies and product differ-
entiation. Scale economies are the second force generating international trade. Finally I add
'iceberg' international trade costs, which differ according to where the commodity is produced
and where it is consumed . The international trade costs have two effects. They determine the
commodity structure of production by generating a departure from Factor Price Equalization
(FPE), and together with the assumptions on consumer willingness to substitute between differ-
ent commodities, trade costs determine the volume of bilateral trade. The model assumptions
are set out in detail below.
'See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985) for models with imperfect competition and more than one
factor.
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1. The world is arranged into C continents equally spaced around the equator. Apart from
location, each continent is identical. On each continent there are 2 countries, 1 each in the
North and South.2 Southern variables, where needed, are marked with an asterisk.
2. There are two factors of production supplied inelastically; skilled labor and unskilled
labor earning factor rewards s and w respectively. The total labor supply is 1. The proportion
of skilled labor is denoted by 3. Northern countries are relatively abundant in skilled labor;
3. There is a continuum of industries z on the interval [0,1]. The index z ends up playing a
dual role in the paper, because below z will also be used to rank industries by factor intensity.
Industries with higher z are more skill intensive.
4. All consumers in all countries are assumed to have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences
with the function of income spent on industry z being b (z) (Equation 1). Expenditure shares
for each industry are therefore constant for all prices and incomes. All income is spent so the
integral of b (z) over the interval [0,11 is 1 (Equation 2).
1
U = Jb(z) n Q(z)dz. (3.1)
o
b(z)dz= 1. (3.2)
0
5. Monopolistic competition. In the traditional model each industry z produces a homoge-
neous good. In this model, there are economies of scale in production and firms can costlessly
differentiate their products. The output of each industry consists of a number of varieties that
are imperfect substitutes for one another. The quantity of variety i in industry z is denoted by
q(z, i). N(z) is the endogenously determined number of varieties in industry z:
2The model can be easily generalized to include more of each type of country on each continent, provided
each continent is identical.
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FN(z) = n(z) + n*(z) (3.3)
As z is no longer a homogeneous good, Q (z) can be interpreted as a sub-utility function
that depends on the quantity of each variety of z consumed. The symmetric CES function is
assumed with elasticity of substitution greater than 1:
Q(z) = (joq(z i)di) , E(0,1]. (3.4)
Production technology, represented by a total cost function TC, is assumed to be identical
Cobb-Douglas in all countries, but there is a fixed cost equal to cz units of production. The
total cost of producing q units of variety i of commodity z is:
TC(q(z, i) ) = sZwl-Z(a + q(z, i)S) (3.5)
Average costs of production decline at all levels of output, although at a decreasing rate.
This cost function has the convenience of generating factor shares that do not depend on factor
rewards. The total cost function also gives the dual role for the index z, because z denotes both
the industry and skilled labor's share of income in that industry. Finally, there is free entry
into each industry, so in equilibrium profits are zero.
6. International trade is assumed to be more costly than domestic trade. International trade
costs are modelled as a transport cost. To avoid the need to model a separate transport sector,
transport costs are introduced in the convenient but special iceberg form: Tr units of a good
must be shipped for 1 unit to arrive in any other country (- > 1). Domestic trade is assumed to
be costless (r = 1). For international trade, r = r (d) is an increasing function of the distance
d between countries.
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B. Equilibrium in an Industry
In general equilibrium consumers maximize utility, firms maximize profits, all factors are
fully employed and trade is balanced. The model solution proceeds in two steps. The first
step is to solve for the partial equilibrium in an arbitrary industry. In particular, I solve for
the share of world production that each country commands, conditional on relative production
costs. I show that countries with lower costs capture larger market shares. The next step is to
show that in general equilibrium, locally abundant factors are relatively cheap. Skilled labor
is relatively cheap in Northern countries, and unskilled labor is relatively cheap in Southern
countries. The North becomes the low-cost producer of skill-intensive goods, and commands
larger shares of these industries. The South is the low-cost producer of low-skill goods, and
produces relatively more of these.
The properties of the model's demand structure have been analyzed in Helpman and Krug-
man (1985)." Firstly, we need four additional pieces of notation. Denote the (constant) elasticity
of substitution between varieties within an industry by a = cr l; let p(z,i) be the price paid
by consumers, inclusive of transport costs, for variety i in industry z, let I (z) be the set of all
varieties in industry z, and let national income be Y = s/3 + w(l - ). Maximization of Q (z)
conditional on expenditure E (z) yields the following demand functions:
q(z,i)D pI(Zi)-' E(z) i I(z). (3.6)
fi, I (Z) (z i)-Idi,
A firm's share of industry revenues depends on its own price and on the prices set by all
other firms in that industry. It is convenient to define the ideal price index G (z):
1)(
G (z) = X p (z i , (3.7)
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';See Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 10.4 in particular.
Due to the unit elasticity of substitution between industries, a constant function of income
b (z) is spent on industry z in every country. An individual Northern firm sets a single factory
gate price of p. Its products sell in its own domestic market at p, but in all other markets the
transport cost raises the price to pr (d). The ideal industry price index G for the Northern
country on an arbitrary continent C is given in Equation 8. G* is symmetric. Implicit in these
indices is the assumption that in equilibrium all Northern countries are alike and all Southern
countries are alike. Except where needed, the 'z' notation is suppressed.
Gc = l- + ± n(pr(dcc'))-' + n* (pr (dcc,)) -Ej (3.8)
C'[C C'
The revenues of a typical Northern firm are given by Equation 9. The three terms reflect
revenues in its domestic market, the C- 1 other Northern markets and the C Southern markets.
The equivalent Southern expression is symmetric.
pq =bY () + E bY pr (dcc,) + - bY* ( (dcc) (3.9)pq-vlG j  G7bY  G* 3.9)
The production and trade structure has also been studied in Helpman and Krugman (1985).4
Each firm produces a different variety of the product. Each country, if it produces in the
industry at all, produces different varieties. Every variety is demanded in every country. Profit
maximizing firms perceive a demand curve that has a constant elasticity, and therefore set price
at a constant markup over marginal cost:5
p(z) = _ sW-Z (3.10)
4See Chapter 7.
'"rhe demand curve faced by a firm has a constant elasticity if the set of varieties is of non-zero measure.
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With free entry, profits are zero in equilibrium. The pricing rule, the zero profit condition
and the special form of the fixed cost produce an equilibrium where all firms produce the same
quantity of output:
q = q* = a(r -1). (3.11)
We now have everything we need to solve for the partial equilibrium in this industry. No-
tation is simplified by defining world income W = C (Y + Y*), the relative price of Northern
goods p = and the expressions F1 = 1 + E (dcc,) - a and F2 = ST (dCC')l-'. t i Condi-
c,#c C'
tional on relative prices, Equations 8 and 9 contain four equations in four unknowns n, n*, G
and G*. These equations may not have positive solutions for both n and n*. If they do not,
the solution for n and n* will either be Equation 12 or Equation 13. If p is low then Equation
12 is the solution; if p is high then Equation 13 is the solution.7
~b(YY) F+Y*) 1
n=O, 2Ypa - [) F -F-12 2n = , n* - b (Y + Y*) if > = F 2Y+ F2 (3.13)P*a (a- 1) F -Lb2 + ))
If both n and n* are positive, Equations 8, 9 and 11 solve for n. , which is given in Equation
14. This expression is derived by dividing the demand Equation 9 by its Southern equivalent;
substituting for q and q* using Equation 11; substituting for C and G* using Equation 8;
and rearranging. The relative number of Northern firms declines in both the relative price of
Northern goods and in the relative size of Southern economies.
f;F1 is the quantity of goods a Northern firm sells in all Northern markets divided by its domestic sales;
F > F2.
7The conditions for p are derived from Equation 14.
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2 Y 2 r- F Y 1)
n (Fi + F2 -) F-F ( Y + 1)--" =* ifiYE (Y2,) (3.14)
Equation 14 can be used to solve for another useful expression, the share v of world revenues
in that industry that accrue to firms in each Northern country. When solving for v, we have to
account for the indirect demand for goods used up in transit. Each Northern firm's revenue is
given by pq, where q is the quantity produced, not the quantity consumed. Equation 15 is the
definition of v. Equation 16 is the solution for v.
v C (npq *) (3.15)C (npq + n*p*q*)
V = 
I if 1 E (O,p]
l + F,24-F2) ( I F+"~iFif Ep ( ,)
_ ( , +pl- )F F2 ( +l)+(F2-F22Y)(.+l) (3.16)
0O if PE [, oo)
The revenue share v declines in the relative price of Northern goods p and increases with
the relative size of Northern economies ~Y*. The sensitivity of market share v to relative price
increases with the elasticity of substitution cr and with the number of countries. Equations
6 and 8 can be used to solve for the FOB share of imports of a given commodity z into the
Northern country C' that are produced in the Northern country C:
F (dcc')1
'U&vC'~~~~~~~ Z -~(3.17)
,-1 ± j~-F
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n* (1 (3.18)In ( z -) In (r (dec,)) - In (F1 - 1 + - lF2) (3.18)
Market share responds negatively to trade costs, positively to relative GDP Y, which
enters indirectly through n, and negatively to relative price, which enters both directly and
indirectly through Yn. But by Equation 10, relative price is equal to relative production costs,
which depend on factor prices. This generates the role for factor abundance; I next demonstrate
that in general equilibrium, locally abundant factors are relatively cheap. Therefore the relative
price of Northern goods declines with the skill intensity of the industry, and every Northern
country captures larger shares of more skill intensive industries. A similar expression can be
derived for imports from Southern countries. An interesting feature of Equation 18 is that
the elasticity of substitution ac between varieties in an industry enters very simply into the
coefficient on the log of bilateral trade costs r (dc,), although this trade cost also appears in
a small way in the second term. By using explicit estimates of actual trade costs, this paper
recovers estimates of a.
C. General Equilibrium
All factors must be fully employed in all countries in equilibrium. With assumed preferences,
the function of world income spent on each industry is invariant to prices and income. With
the assumed production technology, factor shares in each industry are invariant to factor prices.
Skilled labor's share of revenues in industry z is constant and equal to z. The balance goes to
unskilled labor. Equations 19 to 22 are, respectively, the full employment conditions for: skilled
labor in the North; unskilled labor in the North; skilled labor in the South; and unskilled labor
in the South. The left side of each equation is factor demand, the right is factor supply. The
wages of unskilled labor in the South have been normalized to . National income equals
national expenditure in every country, so trade is balanced.
94
1-zb (z) Wv (z) dz = . (3.19)
0
1
J-( -z)b(z) Wv (z) dz = - (3.20)
o0
1
* zb (z) W( - v (z))dz = 3* (3.21)
0
1J(1 -z)b(z) W( - v (z))dz = 1 - 3*. (3.22)
0
So long as C is finite, the failure of FPE can be demonstrated by contradiction. 8 With
FPE, p (z) = 1 by Equation 10, and v (z) is constant over z by Equation 16. By Equations 18
to 21, relative factor demands in the North equal relative factor demands in the South. But
the relative supply of these factors is not equal by assumption. Therefore we cannot have full
employment equilibrium with FPE.
The North has more skilled labor; the South more unskilled labor. Full employment requires
the North to either (i) have a larger share of skill-intensive industries, or (ii) use skilled labor
more intensively in each industry than in the South. For the North to obtain a larger share of
skill-intensive industries, Equation 16 requires that p(z) declines in z. By Equation 10, p(z)
declines in z if and only if < .9 Factor demands obtained by differentiating Equation 5
1In the limit as C -- oo, factor price equalization is again achieved. This is shown by proving that equilibrium
in an arbitrary industry requires production costs to be the same in both the North and the South. The reason
for FPE returning is simple. The domestic market becomes increasingly less important as C gets larger. In the
limit everything is exported, so that transport costs affect locally scarce and abundant factors equally.
'
3This can be proved by differentiating the log of p(z).
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with respect to factor prices show that for any industry, the North will use skilled labor more
intensively than the South if and only if s < * - Therefore skilled labor must become relatively
cheap in the North, and unskilled labor relatively cheap in the South. The relative price p(z)
declines in z, and every Northern country's share of world production in an industry rises with
the skill intensity z of the industry.
The model can be extended to more factors, as in Romalis (2000). This follows from the
partial equilibrium in an industry depending only on relative costs and relative incomes, and
only indirectly through these variables do factor endowments and factor intensities affect how
countries specialize. Extensions therefore require a model of how factor prices and national
income depend on factor endowments.
3.3 Empirical Examination
A. Overview and Data Description
Equation 18 is the basis of trade based examinations of the model. A given country sources
its imports disproportionately from countries where the international trade costs are lower. It
sources specific commodities disproportionately from countries that possess in abundance the
factors that are intensively used in the production of that commodity. It sources more imports
from larger countries. Unfortunately there is no closed form solution for the impact of most of
these explanators; very simple approximations will be estimated instead.
The model's prediction can be examined using detailed commodity trade data, estimates of
international trade costs, and estimates of factor intensity and factor abundance. I use 1988
data from Robert Feenstra's NBER Trade Database on US manufacturing imports classified
by 4-digit SIC industry and country of origin. Data from 1988 is used to match the year for
which I have the most factor abundance data. There are over 400 industries and 150 trading
partners. The shares of US imports by SIC industry are then calculated for each country.
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International trade costs T are estimated for each country and each commodity by dividing
CIF (Cost Including Freight) measures of imports by FOB (Free On Board) import measures.
The problem with this measure is that -r is only observable where imports are non-zero. The
observations where there are no trade are extremely likely to be systematically related to the
variables of interest. For example, where transport costs are high, it is more likely that no
trade is observed. Where a commodity embodies extreme proportions of a factor that is scarce
in a country, the US is unlikely to import any of that commodity from that country. In other
words, the zero's are informative.
Three approaches are taken to the missing 7- problem. The first approach is simply to ignore
the problem, and estimate only where there are observations on -r. The second approach is an
instrumental variables approach. I estimate the missing trade cost data using observed trade
cost data. Trade costs are then certainly measured with error. I then use distance between
capital cities or distance and industry dummies as instruments for the mismeasured trade costs.
I assume that the expected trade cost is an additive function of the industry z and the country
of origin c. Equation 23 is estimated by OLS, and the missing observations on -r are replaced
by their expected value .l` The median transport cost, including estimated values, is almost
11 percent of the FOB value.
Tcz = ac + 3z + Ecz (3.23)
The third approach is to treat the whole observation as missing and use the Heckman
procedure to model the selection and estimate the primary equations. The selection equation
is motivated by the model. Factor proportions and the size of the country of origin will be
determinants of whether we observe any trade.
The model assumes that there are no factor intensity reversals. Indeed, a property of the
model is that factor shares are fixed for each industry. With this assumption, factor intensity
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"'The R2 of this regression is 0.22.
can be consistently ranked using factor share data for just one country. I choose US data both
for reasons of availability and because the estimates are likely to be the most satisfactory due
to the US being the largest and most diverse industrial economy. All factor intensity data are
factor share data derived from the US Census of Manufactures for 1992.
For each industry I calculate the sum of value added and raw materials inputs. Raw ma-
terial inputs are derived from detailed data on intermediate inputs by industry. This data is
screened to keep only food, forestry and mining industry output. Raw material intensity raw
is measured as the value of raw material inputs divided by the sum of raw materials and value
added. Capital intensity capital is estimated as (value added - total compensation)/(value
added +raw materials). Total compensation is apportioned between skilled labor and unskilled
labor according to the proportion of production and non-production workers in the industry,
where following Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) I assume that non-production workers
are skilled and production workers are unskilled. 1 Skill intensity skill is skilled labor's share
of total compensation divided by the sum of raw materials and value added. The intensity of
unskilled labor is simply 1 minus the share of the other factors.
The model relates market shares to trade costs, factor intensity and factor abundance. The
abundance of skilled labor is measured by the human capital to labor ratio from Hall and Jones
(1999), which is based on education levels reported in Barro and Lee (2000). The abundance of
capital is measured by the investment based measure of the capital to labor ratio sourced from
Hall and Jones. The Hall and Jones measures are available for a large number of countries, 123
in total. Raw material abundance is measured by total land area divided by the total labor
force sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2000 CD-ROM, a simple
but imperfect estimate of the abundance of agricultural and mineral resources. All measures of
abundance are relative to the US. Factor abundance and factor intensity data is available for
120 countries and 370 industries.
lThis classification has limitations, since, for example, cleaners (that have not been outsourced) will be
classified as skilled workers while skilled production workers will be classed as unskilled workers. The measure is
correlated with other skill measures, such as average wage levels and, at higher levels of aggregation where data
is available, education levels.
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B. Estimation and Results
The empirical work commences with equations of the form:
Inz = (1 - v) In cz + x'z7r + cz (3.24)
where x'z is a vector of controls suggested by the model, including the log of GDP in
dollars in country c, factor intensities of commodities, factor abundance of countries, and all
interactions between factor intensities and factor abundance. The results for the full sample are
reported in Table 1, while Table 2 reports results for the sample excluding the two countries
that border the US; Canada and Mexico.
The columns labeled OLS1 and OLS2 report OLS regressions on Equation 24 where ob-
servations for which vc = 0 are simply omitted. OLS1 omits controls for factor intensities
and factor abundance while OLS2 includes these controls. The elasticity of the import share
with respect to the GDP of the country of origin is approximately 1. The trade cost enters
extremely significantly, with an elasticity of about -6, suggesting an elasticity of substitution
between varieties within an industry of 7. Excluding Canada and Mexico has a slight effect on
the results, the implied elasticity of substitution from these regressions is approximately 6.
Simply ignoring observations where there is no trade is likely to lead to understatement of
the impact of GDP and trade costs, because zero imports are much more likely to occur for
small countries and for countries where trade is more costly. In the columns headed OLS3 and
OLS4 I have assumed that the customs officials have overlooked a very small amount of trade;
In czc is assumed to be -20 in each case, typically implying between ten cents and ten dollars
worth of imports. OLS2 is simply OLS on Equation 24, with n sC left censored at -20. As
expected, the elasticities increase in absolute value, with the largest effects being on trade costs.
The elasticity of the import share with respect to GDP is now 1.6, reflecting the tendency of
small countries to specialize in a few commodities. The elasticity with respect to trade costs is
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now around -14, suggesting an elasticity of substitution of 15. Excluding Canada and Mexico
reduces the implied elasticity of substitution slightly to around 14.
The columns IV1 through to IV4 report the results of instrumental variables estimation.
Two sets of instruments are used for the mismeasured trade cost variable. Firstly, distance
between capital cities in the country of origin and Washington D.C. is used in IV1 and IV3.
It is assumed that distance is correlated with trade costs, and only effects the volume of trade
through the costs of international trade, broadly defined. Secondly, distance combined with
industry dummies for each 4-digit SIC are used in IV2 and IV4. Trade costs vary widely by
industry. The results using distance alone as an instrument result in extremely high estimates
of the elasticity of substitution, ranging from 79 to 129. Including industry dummies as an
instrument produces much lower implied elasticities of about 15 for the full sample and 13
when Canada and Mexico are excluded.
The columns headed Heckit use the Heckman procedure to model the selection and estimate
the primary equations. The selection equation is motivated by the model. Factor intensities,
factor abundance, all interactions between factor intensities and factor abundance, and the size
of the country of origin are determinants of whether we observe any trade. The estimates imply
elasticities of substitution of about 6.
An interesting feature of Tables 1 and 2 are the high estimates of the willingness of consumers
to substitute between different varieties within the same industry. The implied elasticities of
substitution typically range from 6 to 16. The higher estimates are achieved in some models
when considering observations where there are no imports. High estimates may in part reflect
the existence of economies of scale in distribution, such as some fixed cost for importing or
marketing a variety, or transport and insurance costs that do not increase proportionally with
the size of the shipment. Once demand for a variety becomes too low, it simply might not be
worth importing at all.
At the lower end of estimates, suggesting an elasticity of substitution of 6, the median
transport cost of 11 percent is sufficient to reduce imports of a commodity relative to domestic
production by almost 50 percent. Adding in the median tariff of about 5 percent, this reduction
becomes 60 percent. At the higher end of estimates, with an elasticity of substitution of 15,
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this reduction becomes 80 and 90 percent respectively. Modest international trade costs could
be substantially reducing international trade volumes.
3.4 Conclusion
The results of this paper suggest that international trade costs play an important role in re-
stricting the volume of trade and in determining from where countries source their imports.
One useful product of the empirical examination are estimates of the willingness of consumers
to substitute between different varieties of similar commodities. All of the estimates are high,
with the elasticity of substitution typically ranging from 6 to 15. High elasticities of substitu-
tion imply that even small costs to international trade can have a substantial effect on trade
volumes.
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Table 1: Effect of Trade Costs r on Trade Volumes
Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Lvcz
OLS2
1.027
(0.013)
-6.101
(0.241)
OLS3
1.713
(0.009)
-15.53
(0.347)
YES NO
NO YES
NO NO NO
NO NO NO
OLS4
1.570
(0.017)
-12.52
(0.395)
IV1
1.332
(0.031)
-91.65
(3.670)
IV2
1.567
(0.017)
-13.59
(0.456)
IV3
1.497
(0.020)
-78.42
(2.011)
YES YES YES NO
IV4 Heckit
1.907 1.036
(0.010) (0.012)
-14.24 -5.537
(0.405) (0.191)
-4.566
(0.489)
NO YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES
NO YES
NO
YES YES YES NO
NO YES NO YES NO
dummies in
instruments
N 23658 18765 59160 41093 41093 41093 54375 54375 41749
R2 0.403 0.448 0.412 0.494 0.494 0.438
Notes: robust errors in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. For Heckit model, ordinary standard
errors are reported.
Table 2: Effect of Trade Costs r on Trade Volumes
Sample Excluding Canada and Mexico
Dependent Variable: Lv,,
Variable OLS 1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 IV 1IV2 IV3 IV4 Heckit
Lgdp 0.924 0.964 1.669 1.505 1.326 1.504 1.475 1.867 0.975
(0,008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.017) (0.041) (0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.026)
Lr -5.203 -5.235 -14.79 -11.46 -127.72 -11.95 -88.85 -12.70 -5.092
(0.191) (0.232) (0.343) (0.385) (9.262) (0.430) (3.069) (0.385) (0.283)
Inv(Mills) -3.955
(0.511)
Factor NO YES NO YES YES YES NO NO YES
Proportions
Controls
Observations NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
with missing
'r included
Distance in NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO
instruments
Industry NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES NO
dummies in
instruments
N 22799 18020 58290 40339 41093 40339 53505 53505 40995
R2 0.379 0.437 0.388 0.477 0.477 0.415
Notes: robust errors in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. For Heckit model, ordinary standard
errors are reported.
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OLS1
0.958
(0.008)
-5.824
(0.196)
NO
NO
Variable
Lgdp
LT
Inv(Mills)
Factor
Proportions
Controls
Observations
with missing
X included
Distance in
instruments
Industry
-
Appendix A
Data for Chapter 1
Factor Abundance: For the Heckscher-Ohlin regressions I use Human-Capital-to-Labor ratios
and Capital-to-Labor ratios from Hall and Jones (1999). This data is available for 123 countries
for the year 1988. Raw material abundance is estimated by total land area divided by the total
labor force in 1998 sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2000 CD-ROM.
All measures of abundance are relative to the US.
For the 1972 to 1998 Rybczynski regression I use Barro and Lee (2000) data for average
total years of education and average years of college education for the population aged 15 to
65. For each country I calculate the average years of total education and college education
relative to US levels. I then use the growth of these measures between 1970 and 1995 as my
estimates of the change in relative skill abundance. The data on international tests of students
in mathematics and science are from Barro and Lee (2000). I sum the two scores and divide
the sum by its mean of 1000. Change in capital to labor ratios relative to the US are calculated
using Penn World Tables 5.6 data for capital per worker (KAPW) for 1972 and 1992.
Factor Intensity: Factor intensity estimates are fully described in Section 3A of the text.
GDP Per Capita at PPP: World Bank World Development Indicators CD-ROM for
1998. Penn World Tables 5.6 for earlier years (pwt.econ.upenn.edu).
Imports: Trade data for the USA comes from the USA Trade CD-R.OM for 1998; from
Robert Feenstra's NBER, Trade Database for 1972, 1980 and 1990; and from the United Nations
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Commodity Trade Statistics for 1960. The Feenstra database is already mapped into SIC
classifications. The 1998 data is mapped from HS into SIC classifications using a concordance
maintained by Jon Haveman (www.haveman.org). The 1960 data is mapped from SITC R1 to
SIC using a concordance adapted from the SITC R.2 to SIC concordance maintained by Jon
Haveman. Only manufacturing industries are used (SIC codes 2000 to 3999).
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Appendix B
Full Employment Conditions for
Three Factor Model in Chapter 1
Equations 1 to 6 are the full employment conditions for the three factor model. The equations
are respectively for: skilled labor in the North; capital in the North; unskilled labor in the
North; skilled labor in the South; capital in the South, and unskilled labor in the South. The
wages of unskilled labor in the South have been normalized to 1. The left side of each equation
gives factor demand, while the right gives factor supply.
1 1-z
J zb(kz)Wv(kz)dkdz = 3. (B.1)
0 o0
1 1-z
I0J-kb(kz)Wv(kz)dkdz = y. (B.2)
o 0
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1 1-z
-(1 - z - k)b(kz)lVv(kz)dkdz = 1 -
w
0 0
1 1
- zb(kz)W (-
* kb(kz)W r* I.
- v(kz)) dkdz = *
, - v(kz)) dkdz = -- -
- v(kz)) dkdz = - * -7*-
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(B.3)
1-2
0o o0
1 1-z
0 0
(B.4)
(B.5)
(B.6)
1 1-z
0 0
